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PROSECUTING DARK NET DRUG
MARKETPLACE OPERATORS UNDER THE
FEDERAL CRACK HOUSE STATUTE
Thomas J. Nugent*
Over 70,000 Americans died as the result of a drug overdose in 2017, a
record year following a record year. Amidst this crisis, the popularity of
drug marketplaces on what has been called the “dark net” has exploded.
Illicit substances are sold freely on such marketplaces, and the anonymity
these marketplaces provide has proved troublesome for law enforcement.
Law enforcement has responded by taking down several of these
marketplaces and prosecuting their creators, such as Ross Ulbricht of the
former Silk Road. Prosecutors have typically leveled conspiracy charges
against the operators of these marketplaces—in Ulbricht’s case, alleging a
single drug conspiracy comprising Ulbricht and the thousands of vendors on
the Silk Road. This Note argues that the conspiracy to distribute narcotics
charge is a poor conceptual fit for the behavior of operators of typical dark
net drug marketplaces, and that the federal “crack house” statute provides
a better charge. Though charging these operators under the crack house
statute would be a novel approach, justice is best served when the crime
accurately describes the behavior, as the crack house statute does in
proscribing what dark net drug marketplace operators like Ulbricht do.
INTRODUCTION.................................................................................. 346
I. THE OPIOID CRISIS, THE DARK NET, AND MODERN DRUG
ENFORCEMENT ....................................................................... 348
A.
B.
C.
D.

The Opioid Crisis and Dark Net Drug Marketplaces ....... 349
Conspiracy Law ................................................................ 351
The Ross Ulbricht Prosecution......................................... 353
The Crack House Statute .................................................. 356
II. USING CONSPIRACY LAW TO PROSECUTE TYPICAL DARK NET
DRUG MARKETPLACE OPERATORS ........................................ 359
* J.D. Candidate, 2020, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2013, State University of
New York at Geneseo. The author thanks his family and friends for their support, Professor
Youngjae Lee for his helpful feedback on this Note, and the Fordham Law Review editors and
staff for their guidance and assistance.

345

346

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

A. The Typical Dark Net Drug Marketplace ......................... 359
B. Critiques of Charging the Typical Dark Net Drug
Marketplace Operator with Conspiracy to Distribute
Narcotics ......................................................................... 361
1. The “Rimless Hub-and-Spoke” Problem ................... 361
2. The “Agreement” Element ......................................... 363
3. The “eBay Problem” .................................................. 364
4. The Policy Goals of the Standalone Conspiracy Law
May Not Apply ......................................................... 368
III. THE “CRACK HOUSE” STATUTE—TAILORED FOR ONLINE
DRUG MARKETS ..................................................................... 369
A. A Realistic Solution .......................................................... 370
B. A Plain Text Reading Permits Prosecutions of This
Type ................................................................................ 371
C. Why Push for This Reading At All? .................................. 375
D. Addressing Counterarguments ......................................... 376
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 378
INTRODUCTION
America is in the midst of an opioid epidemic. In 2016, approximately
64,000 people in the United States died of a drug overdose, up roughly 22
percent from the year before.1 Of these deaths, 20,100 involved fentanyl and
fentanyl analogs; 15,400 involved heroin; 14,400 involved prescription
opioids; 10,600 involved cocaine; and 7,660 involved methamphetamine.2
Overdose deaths rose to over 70,000 in 2017,3 and provisional data suggest
that the number slightly shrunk to over 69,000 in 2018.4
Concurrently, technological advances have enabled online drug
marketplaces like Silk Road, Silk Road 2.0, AlphaBay, and Hansa, where

1. Josh Katz, The First Count of Fentanyl Deaths in 2016: Up 540% in Three Years,
N.Y. TIMES: UPSHOT (Sept. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/09/02/
upshot/fentanyl-drug-overdose-deaths.html [https://perma.cc/4T74-7MTK].
2. Id.
3. Josh Katz & Margot Sanger-Katz, ‘The Numbers Are So Staggering.’ Overdose
Deaths Set a Record Last Year, N.Y. TIMES: UPSHOT (Nov. 29, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/11/29/upshot/fentanyl-drug-overdose-deaths.html
[https://perma.cc/M78X-WA6E].
4. Jon Kamp, Overdose Deaths Likely to Fall for First Time Since 1990, WALL ST. J.
(June 26, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/overdose-deaths-likely-to-fall-for-first-timesince-1990-11561541406 [https://perma.cc/AY42-EHSX].
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drugs are widely available.5 These marketplaces, located on the “dark net,”6
a subset of websites that exist on an encrypted network, offer buyers and
sellers a near-anonymous transactional space.7 Law enforcement, given
limited resources, has an incentive to shut down these marketplaces rather
than prosecute individual users. Recently, one of the tools law enforcement
has used to take down dark net drug marketplaces is the “conspiracy to
distribute narcotics” charge.8
While prosecutions of dark net marketplace operators with narcotics
conspiracy charges have yielded success,9 this Note will argue that the
conspiracy to distribute narcotics charge typically will be a poor conceptual
fit for prosecuting dark net drug marketplace operators. Criminal justice is
best carried out when the crime charged accurately tracks the criminal
behavior engaged in. The further the charge is from the behavior, the less
justifiable a conviction, while the closer the charge to the behavior, the more
justifiable a conviction. Typical dark net marketplace structures tend not to
resemble conspiracies between the operator and the users, so while such
5. See, e.g., Nicolas Christin, Traveling the Silk Road: A Measurement Analysis of a
Large Anonymous Online Marketplace, 22D INT’L WORLD WIDE WEB CONF. 222 (May 2013),
https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2488408 [https://perma.cc/3GT5-AJS8] (“We were able to
determine that Silk Road indeed mostly caters drugs . . . .”); Nathaniel Popper, Opioid Dealers
Embrace the Dark Web to Send Deadly Drugs by Mail, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (June 10,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/10/business/dealbook/opioid-dark-web-drugoverdose.html [https://perma.cc/UPJ7-9T2M]; Kyle Soska & Nicolas Christin, Measuring the
Longitudinal Evolution of the Online Anonymous Marketplace Ecosystem, 24TH USENIX
CONF. ON SECURITY SYMP. 40–42 (Aug. 2015), https://www.usenix.org/system/
files/conference/usenixsecurity15/sec15-paper-soska-updated.pdf [https://perma.cc/JVW6W44W] (highlighting the lifespan of select marketplaces and product types).
6. This Note will use the term “dark net” to refer to the place where these marketplaces
are found, but many media outlets often refer to the same place as the “dark web.”
7. See, e.g., United States v. McLamb, 880 F.3d 685, 687 (4th Cir. 2018) (“The dark web
is a collection of encrypted networks providing strong privacy protections to its users.”); Di
Ma & Gregory D. Kaufmann, War on Drugs 2.1: Setting the Terms of Engagement, 28 ALB.
L.J. SCI. & TECH. 94, 95–96 (2017) (“The Dark Web comprises of anonymously hosted web
pages that are only accessible through software that masks user IP addresses, such as The
Onion Router . . . . The main benefit of the Dark Web is anonymity.”).
8. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Operator of Silk Road 2.0
Website Charged in Manhattan Federal Court (Nov. 6, 2014), https://www.fbi.gov/contactus/field-offices/newyork/news/press-releases/operator-of-silk-road-2.0-website-charged-inmanhattan-federal-court [https://perma.cc/2SA4-8F74] [hereinafter November 2014 Press
Release]; Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Ross Ulbricht, aka Dread Pirate
Roberts, Sentenced in Manhattan Federal Court to Life in Prison (May 29, 2015),
https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices/newyork/news/press-releases/ross-ulbricht-akadread-pirate-roberts-sentenced-in-manhattan-federal-court-to-life-in-prison [https://perma.cc/
XG56-AS7C] [hereinafter May 2015 Press Release]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
AlphaBay, the Largest Online ‘Dark Market,’ Shut Down (July 20, 2017), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/alphabay-largest-online-dark-market-shut-down [https://perma.cc/
43H4-Z9J9].
9. See, e.g., Joseph Cox, Silk Road 2.0 Right-Hand Man Pleads Guilty, VICE:
MOTHERBOARD (Mar. 22, 2016, 11:40 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/jpg59g/silkroad-20-right-hand-man-pleads-guilty [https://perma.cc/75UD-NU7N]; Sam Thielman, Silk
Road Operator Ross Ulbricht Sentenced to Life in Prison, GUARDIAN (May 29, 2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/may/29/silk-road-ross-ulbricht-sentenced
[https://perma.cc/2ZJU-WJMY].
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operators should be held accountable for their actions, doing so through the
conspiracy charge poses serious concerns for justice.
Instead, what is needed is a statute that prohibits exactly the type of
behavior the typical dark net drug marketplace operator engages in—
maintaining a place for the purpose of the distribution of drugs. Fortunately,
such a statute already exists—the federal “crack house” statute.10 Though
prosecuting dark net drug marketplace operators with the crack house statute
is a novel approach entailing its own set of challenges, charging a narcotics
conspiracy where none exists threatens prosecutorial legitimacy.
Part I of this Note will review the opioid crisis and the widespread
availability of illicit drugs through new dark net marketplaces; discuss the
elements of the conspiracy to distribute narcotics charge; briefly review the
prosecution of Ross Ulbricht, the operator of the Silk Road drug marketplace;
and then end by taking a closer look at 21 U.S.C. § 856, the crack house
statute. Part II will define the typical dark net drug marketplace before asking
whether conspiracy law might be a poor conceptual fit for prosecuting the
operator of such a marketplace, using the Ulbricht prosecution as a helpful
example. Part III will argue that a better charge than conspiracy to distribute
narcotics is needed to prosecute the operator of the typical dark net drug
marketplace, that the ongoing opioid crisis demands a prosecutorial tool in
the absence of the conspiracy charge, and that the crack house charge is a
better fit than conspiracy law when applied to the typical operator case.
I. THE OPIOID CRISIS, THE DARK NET, AND MODERN DRUG ENFORCEMENT
Overdose deaths in America have rapidly increased over the past several
years.11 Fatal overdose data for 2017, and initial data for 2018, suggest that
the crisis is nearing or has reached an apex.12 At the same time, drug
marketplaces on the dark net have grown in scope and revenue.13 U.S.
prosecutors have responded by pursuing the operators of these marketplaces
in a variety of ways, often by bringing the charge of conspiracy to distribute

10. 21 U.S.C. § 856 (2012).
11. Katz, supra note 1.
12. See Christopher Ingraham, Fentanyl Use Drove Drug Overdose Deaths to a Record
High in 2017, CDC Estimates, WASH. POST (Aug. 15, 2018), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/08/15/fentanyl-use-drove-drug-overdose-deathsrecord-high-cdc-estimates/ [https://perma.cc/LZX2-VBGQ]; Kamp, supra note 4; German
Lopez, 2017 Was the Worst Year Ever for Drug Overdose Deaths in America, VOX (Aug. 16,
2018,
2:00
PM),
https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2018/8/16/17698204/
opioid-epidemic-overdose-deaths-2017 [https://perma.cc/5DVY-SX4P]; see also Katz &
Sanger-Katz, supra note 3.
13. KRISTY KRUITHOF ET AL., RAND EUR., INTERNET-FACILITATED DRUGS TRADE: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE SIZE, SCOPE AND THE ROLE OF THE NETHERLANDS 61 (2016),
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1600/RR1607/RAND_RR
1607.pdf [https://perma.cc/VNL2-2UQD] (finding, as of 2016, “evidence of a substantial
growth in cryptomarkets since the closure of the first major drug cryptomarket, Silk Road 1.0,
in September 2013” and that “listings for drugs has seen a nearly six-fold increase; the
numbers of vendors and transactions have nearly tripled; and revenue (aka ‘turnover’) has
doubled over the period”).
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narcotics.14 For example, Ross Ulbricht, creator and operator of the Silk
Road dark net drug marketplace, was charged with and eventually convicted
of conspiracy to distribute narcotics—the prosecution alleging a single, allencompassing conspiracy between him and each of the sellers of the
marketplace.15 While prosecutors were successful in bringing the conspiracy
to distribute narcotics charge, among others,16 they failed to bring a charge
under the crack house statute, 21 U.S.C. § 856, which makes it a federal
crime to “knowingly . . . maintain any place, whether permanently or
temporarily, for the purpose of . . . distributing . . . any controlled
substance.”17 This Part will review the landscape of the opioid crisis, the
dark net, the elements of conspiracy to distribute narcotics, the Ulbricht
prosecution, and the history and current use of the crack house statute.
A. The Opioid Crisis and Dark Net Drug Marketplaces
Overdose deaths in America have reached crisis levels. Beginning in
1999, deaths from opioid pain relievers have risen steadily year after year18
and have increased in 2017.19 The economic cost of the crisis is staggering—
the Council of Economic Advisers for the White House estimated the cost of
the crisis at just over $500 billion in 2015 alone, a year when 33,000
Americans died of overdoses.20 The U.S. Congress,21 the Office of the

14. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
15. Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment
at 9, United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. 14-cr-68 (KBF)),
2014 WL 7151214 (“Count One charges that he conspired with others to distribute drugs, a
charge that readily encompasses Ulbricht’s operation of the Silk Road website. In that role,
Ulbricht entered into a joint venture with thousands of drug dealers around the world to
distribute drugs online.”).
16. Benjamin Weiser, Man Behind Silk Road Website Is Convicted on All Counts, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/05/nyregion/man-behind-silk-roadwebsite-is-convicted-on-all-counts.html [https://perma.cc/5H46-BT8W].
17. 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) (2012).
18. Andrew Kolodny et al., The Prescription Opioid and Heroin Crisis: A Public Health
Approach to an Epidemic of Addiction, 36 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 559, 560 (2015) (“Over
the past 15 years, the rate of opioid pain reliever (OPR) use in the United States has soared.
From 1999 to 2011, consumption of hydrocodone more than doubled and consumption of
oxycodone increased by nearly 500%. During the same time frame, the OPR-related overdose
death rate nearly quadrupled.”).
19. See Lopez, supra note 12.
20. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE UNDERESTIMATED
COST OF THE OPIOID CRISIS 1 (2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/
files/images/The%20Underestimated%20Cost%20of%20the%20Opioid%20Crisis.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6U9C-VQCX].
21. Colby Itkowitz, Senate Passes Sweeping Opioids Package, WASH. POST (Sept. 17,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/09/17/senate-set-pass-sweepingopioids-package/ [https://perma.cc/FDT7-D26S]. This package was ultimately enacted into
law as the SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act, Pub. L. No. 115-271, 132 Stat. 3894
(2018).
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President,22 and individual states and state agencies have responded to the
crisis.23
As the opioid epidemic has accelerated, new technologies have helped to
create a variety of online dark net drug marketplaces. The dark net refers to
a subset of the internet characterized in large part by anonymity—dark net
spaces are primarily inaccessible to regular internet browsers, instead
requiring software like The Onion Router (Tor) to mask users’ Internet
Protocol (IP) addresses and identities.24 Networks allowing totally
anonymous and encrypted communications create difficulties for law
Typical dark net
enforcement and opportunities for criminals.25
marketplaces, like the Silk Road, Evolution, and AlphaBay, host primarily
drug transactions.26
U.S. prosecutors have successfully taken down several of these drug
marketplaces by targeting their operators.27 In each of these takedowns,
22. President Donald J. Trump’s Initiative to Stop Opioid Abuse and Reduce Drug Supply
and Demand, WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/president-donald-j-trumps-initiative-stop-opioid-abuse-reduce-drug-supplydemand/ [https://perma.cc/STX3-YHG9].
23. See, e.g., WASH. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, 2018 WASHINGTON STATE OPIOID
RESPONSE PLAN (2018), https://www.doh.wa.gov/Portals/1/Documents/1000/140-182StateOpioidResponsePlan.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JAX-79GK]; Addressing the Opioid
Epidemic in New York State, N.Y. ST.: DEP’T OF HEALTH, https://www.health.ny.gov/
community/opioid_epidemic/ [https://perma.cc/UU7P-5FJS] (last updated Mar. 2018);
Treating Heroin and Opioid Use Disorder, COMMONWEALTH OF PA., https://
www.pa.gov/guides/opioid-epidemic/ [https://perma.cc/S7ZS-YGXC] (last visited Aug. 22,
2019).
24. See Ma & Kaufmann, supra note 7, at 95; Jessica A. Wood, The Darknet: A Digital
Copyright Revolution, 16 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 14, 30–33 (2010); Amanda Haasz, Note,
Underneath It All: Policing International Child Pornography on the Dark Web, 43 SYRACUSE
J. INT’L L. & COM. 353, 354–58 (2016); A. Dominick Romeo, Comment, Hidden Threat: The
Dark Web Surrounding Cyber Security, 43 N. KY. L. REV. 73, 74–77 (2016).
25. See generally Going Dark: Encryption, Technology, and the Balance Between Public
Safety and Privacy: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2015) (joint
statement of James B. Comey, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation and Sally Yates,
Deputy Att’y Gen., Department of Justice) (explaining the obstacles posed to law
enforcement); Kaleigh E. Aucoin, Note, The Spider’s Parlor: Government Malware on the
Dark Web, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 1433, 1438–41 (2018).
26. See, e.g., Julian Broséus et al., A Geographical Analysis of Trafficking on a Popular
Darknet Market, 277 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 88, 92–96 (2017) (discussing Evolution sales);
Nicolas Christin, An EU-Focused Analysis of Drug Supply on the AlphaBay Marketplace,
EUR. MONITORING CTR. FOR DRUGS & DRUG ADDICTION 12–13 (2017), http://
www.emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/attachments/6622/AlphaBay-final-paper.pdf [https://
perma.cc/M54P-YRQ6] (discussing AlphaBay transactions); Christin, supra note 5, at 7–9
(discussing Silk Road sales).
27. Andy Greenberg, End of the Silk Road: FBI Says It’s Busted the Web’s Biggest
Anonymous Drug Black Market, FORBES (Oct. 2, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/andygreenberg/2013/10/02/end-of-the-silk-road-fbi-busts-the-webs-biggestanonymous-drug-black-market [https://perma.cc/2JAU-6E8S]; Donna Leinwand Leger, Feds
Shut Down Silk Road 2.0, Arrest San Francisco Man, USA TODAY (Nov. 6, 2014, 4:04 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/11/06/feds-shut-down-silk-roadcopycat/18591155/ [https://perma.cc/56C5-KLXL]; Nathaniel Popper & Rebecca R. Ruiz, 2
Leading Online Black Markets Are Shut Down by Authorities, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (July
20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/20/business/dealbook/alphabay-dark-webopioids.html [https://perma.cc/9T3Z-JL89].
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prosecutors leveled a charge of conspiracy to distribute narcotics at the
operators, among others.28
B. Conspiracy Law
It is a federal crime to “knowingly or intentionally . . . distribute . . . a
controlled substance.”29 Under 21 U.S.C. § 846, it is also a federal crime to
conspire to do so.30 The crime of conspiracy exists as a separate offense
primarily to guard against the danger of concerted action—the theory being
that individuals working together to achieve criminal goals are capable of
more harm than they would be on their own.31 Conspiracy typically has four
elements: first, an agreement between two or more parties; second, that the
agreement be to achieve an illegal goal; third, that the parties have knowledge
of and participate in the conspiracy; and fourth, at least one party committed
at least one overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.32
What constitutes an agreement differs between courts—an explicit
agreement will suffice, but so too might a willingness to work together,
mutual promises, or a meeting of the minds.33 What is clear about the
agreement element is that, due to the often-secretive nature of conspiracies,
a formal agreement is not necessary—jurors may infer that an agreement
exists even when it is implicit.34
The illegal goal element means that the government must establish that the
purpose of the conspiracy was to either defraud the United States or violate
a federal law.35 21 U.S.C. § 846 requires that the conspiracy’s goal be to
violate any offense listed within § 846, including its prohibitions on drug
possession and distribution.36

28. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. This Note primarily focuses on the Silk
Road prosecution because it was the only dark net drug marketplace enforcement taken all the
way through trial.
29. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012).
30. Id. § 846.
31. See, e.g., Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593–94 (1961) (noting that
“[c]oncerted action both increases the likelihood that the criminal object will be successfully
attained and decreases the probability that the individuals involved will depart from their path
of criminality” and that “[g]roup association for criminal purposes often, if not normally,
makes possible the attainment of ends more complex than those which one criminal could
accomplish”).
32. Damon Porter, Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1307, 1310–14
(2017). However, drug conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846 does not require the showing of an
overt act. United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 11 (1994).
33. Laurent Sacharoff, Conspiracy as Contract, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 405, 414–24
(2016).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Gardiner, 463 F.3d 445, 457 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding a
formal agreement unnecessary in a RICO conspiracy because “[a] defendant’s agreement to
participate in the RICO conspiracy may be inferred from his acts”); United States v.
Mickelson, 378 F.3d 810, 821 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Because the details of a conspiracy often are
shrouded in secrecy, circumstantial evidence and inferences from the parties’ actions may be
used to establish the conspiracy’s existence.”).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012).
36. 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012).
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The knowledge element requires evidence that the defendant had the
specific intent to engage in the behavior that constituted the criminal object.37
Though knowledge may be shown with circumstantial evidence,38 without
proof of voluntary participation by the defendant, the conspiracy charge will
necessarily fail.39
Conspiracy law offers prosecutors several advantages. Wayne LeFave, a
leading scholar on criminal substantive law and procedure, identified five
distinct benefits: (1) the inherent vagueness in the crime of conspiracy
itself;40 (2) that the trial venue may be proper in any jurisdiction in which an
overt act took place;41 (3) the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule;42
(4) the wide latitude afforded prosecutors in admitting circumstantial
evidence;43 and (5) the joint trial.44
Yet courts and scholars alike have criticized these advantages as unfair. In
particular, while the inherent vagueness of the crime allows prosecutors to
attack what may be truly secretive and kaleidoscopic conspiracy structures,
that same vagueness is often maligned.45 Another concern of scholars is the
shifting nature of the agreement element,46 which has important implications
37. See, e.g., United States v. Hassan, 578 F.3d 108, 123 (2d Cir. 2008) (“A conspiracy
conviction cannot be sustained unless the government established beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant had the specific intent to violate the substantive statute.”); United States v.
Morgan, 385 F.3d 196, 206 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Conspiracy is a specific intent crime . . . . ‘Proof
that the defendant knew that some crime would be committed is not enough.’” (quoting United
States v. Friedman, 300 F.3d 111, 124 (2d Cir. 2002))).
38. See, e.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942); United States v. Gardner,
488 F.3d 700, 711 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Fuchs, 467 F.3d 889, 908 (5th Cir. 2006).
39. United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205, 210 (1940) (“The gist of the offense of
conspiracy . . . is agreement among the conspirators to commit an offense attended by an act
of one or more of the conspirators to effect the object of the conspiracy . . . . Those having no
knowledge of the conspiracy are not conspirators . . . .”); United States v. Nguyen, 493 F.3d
613, 618 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he Government must prove the defendants knew of the
conspiracy’s unlawful objective . . . .”); United States v. Ndiaye, 434 F.3d 1270, 1294 (11th
Cir. 2006) (“The knowledge requirement is satisfied when the Government shows a
defendant’s awareness of the essential nature of the conspiracy.”).
40. 2 WAYNE R. LEFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 12.1(b)(1) (3d ed. 2018).
41. Id. § 12.1(b)(2).
42. Id. § 12.1(b)(3).
43. Id. § 12.1(b)(4).
44. Id. § 12.1(b)(5).
45. See, e.g., Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445–46 (1949) (criticizing the
conspiracy crime as an “elastic, sprawling and pervasive offense,” and stating, “[t]he modern
crime of conspiracy is so vague that it almost defies definition”); Albert J. Harno, Intent in
Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 624, 624 (1941) (“In the long category of crimes there
is none, not excepting criminal attempt, more difficult to confine within the boundaries of
definitive statement than conspiracy.”); Francis B. Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 HARV. L.
REV. 393, 393 (1922) (“A doctrine so vague in its outlines and uncertain in its fundamental
nature as criminal conspiracy lends no strength or glory to the law; it is a veritable quicksand
of shifting opinion and ill-considered thought.”).
46. See, e.g., Benjamin E. Rosenberg, Several Problems in Criminal Conspiracy Laws
and Some Proposals for Reform, 43 CRIM. L. BULL. 427, 441 (2007) (“Courts have further
expanded the crime of conspiracy by reifying the conspiratorial agreement, treating it as if it
were something more than the mere agreement between or among people or entities . . . . The
language used evokes a metaphor . . . . [I]f a jury is directed in a way that encourages it to use
the metaphor, then the defendant may be prejudiced.”); Sacharoff, supra note 33, at 414 (“In
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in the context of alleged agreements between dark net drug marketplace
operators and their users.47 Scholars have also criticized the hearsay
exception for coconspirator statements on various grounds,48 as well as the
broad venue provision for conspiracy cases,49 but these concerns will not be
addressed in this Note.
C. The Ross Ulbricht Prosecution
The Silk Road was an online drug marketplace located on the dark net that
linked buyers and sellers.50 Started in 2011, the Silk Road rapidly expanded
as a marketplace until 2013.51 Users could list or purchase a variety of items
on the Silk Road, but the most common items transacted for were drugs,
including marijuana, prescription pills, cocaine, ecstasy, heroin, and other
controlled substances.52 One defining feature of the Silk Road was the strong
anonymity it offered users. Accessible only through the Tor browser, and
through the use of Bitcoin as an electronic payment system, the Silk Road
allowed users to transact mostly free of anchors to their true identities, such
as IP addresses or bank records.53 As of July 2013, there were allegedly
957,079 registered user accounts on the Silk Road.54 Between February 2011
and July 2013, over 1.2 million transactions allegedly took place on the
website.55 Revenue for sales totaled roughly 600,000 bitcoins, for the 2013
equivalent of roughly $1.2 billion, and the Silk Road earned the equivalent
of roughly $79.8 million in commissions.56
The Silk Road was shut down by U.S. law enforcement in 2013, and its
creator, Ross Ulbricht, was arrested.57 After a jury trial, Ulbricht was
convicted in 2015 on all seven counts he faced: distributing narcotics;
distributing narcotics by means of the internet; conspiring to distribute
assessing how legislatures or courts define ‘agreement’ in conspiracy, we run headlong into a
threshold problem: they don’t.”).
47. See infra Part II.A.
48. See, e.g., Ben Trachtenberg, Coconspirators, “Coventurers,” and the Exception
Swallowing the Hearsay Rule, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 581, 637–48 (2009); Patrick J. Sullivan, Note,
Bootstrapping of Hearsay Under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E): Further Erosion of
the Coconspirator Exemption, 74 IOWA L. REV. 467, 469–70 (1989).
49. See, e.g., Robert L. Ullmann, One Hundred Years After Hyde: Time to Expand Venue
Safeguards in Federal Criminal Conspiracy Cases?, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1003, 1024–
28 (2012).
50. See Alice Huang, Note, Reaching Within Silk Road: The Need for a New Subpoena
Power That Targets Illegal Bitcoin Transactions, 56 B.C. L. REV. 2093, 2104 (2015).
51. Carmine DePiero, Note, Deciphering Cryptocurrency: Shining a Light on the Deep
Dark Web, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1267, 1274–75.
52. Christin, supra note 5, at 8–9.
53. Soska & Christin, supra note 5, at 33.
54. Sealed Complaint at 14, United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(No. 14-cr-68 (KBF)) [hereinafter Ulbricht Complaint].
55. Id. at 15. At trial, the government provided evidence showing that the Silk Road
generated revenues of more than $213 million. See Weiser, supra note 16.
56. Ulbricht Complaint, supra note 54, at 15.
57. James Ball et al., FBI Claims Largest Bitcoin Seizure After Arrest of Alleged Silk Road
Founder, GUARDIAN (Oct. 2, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/oct/02/
alleged-silk-road-website-founder-arrested-bitcoin [https://perma.cc/HAS4-PB29].
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narcotics; engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise; conspiring to commit
computer hacking; conspiring to traffic in false identity documents; and
conspiring to commit money laundering.58 He was sentenced to life in prison
in 2015.59 This Note only focuses on one charge the prosecution brought—
conspiracy to distribute narcotics60—and one that it did not—maintaining a
place for the purpose of the distribution of drugs under the crack house
statute.61 This Note will argue that the former fails to accurately describe the
behavior engaged in and the latter describes it nearly perfectly.
The government’s theory behind the narcotics conspiracy charge was that
Ulbricht entered into a joint agreement with thousands of drug dealers around
the world—the sellers on the Silk Road—to distribute drugs online.62 In
furtherance of this conspiracy, he created and maintained the Silk Road to
facilitate drug deals and evade law enforcement.63 In return, he would earn
a commission on every transaction.64 The elements of the conspiracy, thus,
were as follows: first, the “agreement,” made between Ulbricht and each
other seller on the Silk Road, was to distribute drugs; second, the “criminal
object” of the conspiracy was to violate federal narcotics law;65 and third,
Ulbricht had knowledge of this conspiracy involving him and the sellers on
the Silk Road, and the sellers had knowledge of this conspiracy between
Ulbricht and themselves.
Before trial, the court denied Ulbricht’s motion to dismiss the indictment,
including the narcotics conspiracy count.66 In doing so, the court carefully
considered the intricacies of the alleged conspiracy before deciding that the
indictment sufficiently alleged a narcotics conspiracy.67 Because the court’s
breakdown of conspiracy law in the context of Ulbricht’s creation of the Silk
Road is illuminating, its discussion will be briefly reviewed.
First, the court asked whether there could be a legally cognizable
agreement between Ulbricht and each of the users of the site to engage in
narcotics trafficking, and if so, what the difference was between Ulbricht’s
conduct and the conduct of a person who designed a legitimate online
marketplace like, for example, eBay.68 It answered yes and determined that
the intent of the creator distinguishes the two.69 The court stated that what
was alleged in the indictment was that Ulbricht “purposefully and
intentionally designed, created, and operated Silk Road to facilitate unlawful
58. May 2015 Press Release, supra note 8.
59. Id.
60. Superseding Indictment at 4–7, United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. 14-cr-68 (KBF)).
61. 21 U.S.C. § 856 (2012).
62. Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment,
supra note 15, at 9.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 21 U.S.C. § 846.
66. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 570.
67. Id. at 562.
68. Id. at 555.
69. Id. at 555–57.
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transactions.”70 Ensuing sales on the site could then amount to circumstantial
evidence of a conspiracy, as could evidence of facts alleged in the indictment,
including that Ulbricht benefitted monetarily from the site and that he used
violence to protect the site and its proceeds.71 In distinguishing the Silk Road
from a legitimate marketplace, the court held, “Ulbricht is alleged to have
knowingly and intentionally constructed and operated an expansive black
market for selling and purchasing narcotics . . . . This separates Ulbricht’s
conduct from the mass of others whose websites may—without their
planning or expectation—be used for unlawful purposes.”72
Second, the court asked who the alleged coconspirators could be, and what
form the alleged conspiracy could take.73 It pointed to the indictment, which
alleged a single conspiracy consisting of “several thousand drug dealers and
other unlawful vendors,” and then discussed two typical conspiracy
structures: the “chain” conspiracy and the “hub-and-spoke” conspiracy.74
The court stated that “the form of the conspiracy is not as important as a
determination that at least one other person joined in the alleged
conspiratorial agreement with Ulbricht” and that, while complex, the
questions as to the form of the indictment were “issues for trial and not for
this stage.”75
Third, the court asked when any agreement could have occurred between
Ulbricht and the alleged coconspirators, whether each coconspirator’s mind
could have met Ulbricht’s, and whether Ulbricht, by designing the Silk Road,
made an enduring show of intent to join the conspiracy.76 It answered each
of these questions by analogy and suggested that by creating and maintaining
the Silk Road, Ulbricht could have constructed a perpetual offer to join into
a conspiracy with any future users of the platform.77 According to the court,
it was as though Ulbricht posted “a sign on a (worldwide) bulletin board that
said: ‘I have created an anonymous, untraceable way to traffic narcotics . . . .
[U]se the platform as much as you would like, provided you pay me a
percentage of your profits and adhere to my other terms of service.’”78 It
was therefore possible that each time someone signed up on the site, the signup could function as an acceptance of Ulbricht’s offer, and “as a matter of
law, he or she may become a coconspirator.”79
Finally, the court asked whether it was necessary or even possible “to
pinpoint how the agreement between Ulbricht and his coconspirators was
made” and whether an agreement could be made by an end user, such as a
Silk Road seller, interacting with computer software.80 It held that such an
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 556.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 557.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 557–58.
Id. at 558.
Id.
Id.
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agreement via software was possible and cited case law holding that an
agreement within the conspiracy context need not involve words exchanged
in person, and that all that was necessary was some evidence introduced at
trial showing that the conspirators “have taken knowing and intentional
actions to work together in some mutually dependent way to achieve the
unlawful object.”81
D. The Crack House Statute
Ulbricht was not charged under the crack house statute, but because it
might apply to the behavior he engaged in, it requires a closer look. The
federal crack house statute was enacted as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act
of 1986.82 Section 856(a)(1) makes it a crime to “knowingly open, lease,
rent, use, or maintain any place, whether permanently or temporarily, for the
purpose of manufacturing, distributing, or using any controlled substance.”83
Section 856(a)(2) makes it a crime to
manage or control any place, whether permanently or temporarily, either as
an owner, lessee, agent, employee, occupant, or mortgagee, and knowingly
and intentionally rent, lease, profit from, or make available for use, with or
without compensation, the place for the purpose of unlawfully
manufacturing, storing, distributing, or using a controlled substance.84

Section 856(b) provides for punishment—for violating either subsection of
856(a), “a term of imprisonment of not more than 20 years or a fine of not
more than $500,000, or both, or a fine of $2,000,000 for a person other than
an individual.”85
Importantly, “place” is not currently defined in the statute. It would
therefore be helpful to look at the statute’s history for guidance. The original
statute was narrower. Section 856(a)(1), as passed in 1986, only made it a
crime to “knowingly open or maintain any place for the purpose of
manufacturing, distributing, or using any controlled substance.”86 The Illicit
Drug Anti-Proliferation Act of 200387 supplemented this language and
replaced “open or maintain any place” with “open, lease, rent, use, or
maintain any place, whether permanently or temporarily.”88
Similarly, § 856(a)(2), as passed in 1986, only made it unlawful to
manage or control any building, room, or enclosure, either as an owner,
lessee, agent, employee, or mortgagee, and knowingly and intentionally
rent, lease, or make available for use, with or without compensation, the

81. Id. at 558–59.
82. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
83. 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) (2012).
84. Id. § 856(a)(2).
85. Id. § 856(b).
86. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 § 1841.
87. Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
88. Id. § 608.
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building, room, or enclosure for the purpose of unlawfully manufacturing,
storing, distributing, or using a controlled substance.89

The Illicit Drug Anti–Proliferation Act of 2003 struck much of this language
and widened the statute’s reach by making it a crime to
manage or control any place, whether permanently or temporarily, either as
an owner, lessee, agent, employee, occupant, or mortgagee, and knowingly
and intentionally rent, lease, profit from, or make available for use, with or
without compensation, the place for the purpose of unlawfully
manufacturing, storing, distributing, or using a controlled substance.90

Importantly, the amendment removed the “enclosure” requirement of
§ 856(a)(2) and replaced the more-specific “building, room, or enclosure”91
with the current “place” language and criminalized knowingly and
intentionally “profit[ing] from” such a place.92
Though sections 856(a)(1) and 856(a)(2) appear to be similar, courts have
interpreted them as doing different work. Courts typically construe
§ 856(a)(1) as requiring a specific intent to knowingly open or maintain any
place for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, or using any controlled
substance; that is, to be convicted under § 856(a)(1), the defendant must have
the specific intent to use the place in order to manufacture, distribute, or use
a controlled substance.93 On the other hand, courts typically construe
§ 856(a)(2) as requiring a lesser degree of knowledge or intent on the part of
89. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 § 1841.
90. 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2) (2012).
91. Illicit Drug Anti-Proliferation Act of 2003 § 608.
92. 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2).
93. See, e.g., United States v. Shetler, 665 F.3d 1150, 1162 (9th Cir. 2011) (“‘[I]n the
residential context, the manufacture (or distribution or use) of drugs must be at least one of
the primary or principal uses to which the house is put.’ Restricting the application of
§ 856(a)(1) to those individuals whose manufacture, distribution, or use of drugs in their
residence constitutes,” the Court stated, “‘one of the primary or principal’ purposes of their
occupancy of that residence ensures that the statute does not extend beyond its intended
coverage so as to encompass ‘incidental’ drug use.” (citation omitted) (quoting United States
v. Verners, 53 F.3d 291, 296 (10th Cir. 1995))); United States v. Russell, 595 F.3d 633, 643
(6th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he definition of ‘purpose’ adopted by the district judge—that the
government need only prove that the defendant’s drug-related purpose for maintaining a
premises be ‘significant or important’—is the proper definition of ‘purpose’ in this circuit in
the context of § 856 prosecutions.”); United States v. Becerra, 97 F.3d 669, 672 (2d Cir. 1996)
(“To convict a defendant as a principal under 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1), the government was
required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant (1) opened or maintained a
place; (2) for the purpose of distributing or packaging controlled substances; and (3) did so
knowingly.”); United States v. Verners, 53 F.3d 291, 296–97 (10th Cir. 1995) (“We agree that
the ‘crack-house’ statute was designed to punish those who use their property to run drug
businesses—hence, the more characteristics of a business that are present, the more likely it
is that the property is being used ‘for the purpose of’ those drug activities prohibited by
§ 856(a)(1).”); United States v. Lancaster, 968 F.2d 1250, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (finding that
a jury instruction accurately set out “the elements of a subsection 856(a)(1) violation, namely,
that the defendant open or maintain a place with the purpose that drugs be manufactured,
distributed or used there”); United States v. Mei-Fen Chen, 913 F.2d 183, 190 (5th Cir. 1990)
(“In examining the plain language of the statute, we find that the statute is unambiguous; the
phrase for the purpose of applies to the person who opens or maintains the place for the illegal
activity. . . . [A]ny other interpretation would render § 856(a)(2) essentially superfluous.”).

358

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

the owner, lessee, agent, employee, or mortgagee.94 Section 856(a)(1), then,
prohibits individuals from maintaining a place for the explicit purpose of
distributing drugs, while § 856(a)(2) prohibits individuals from maintaining
a place with the knowledge that it is being used to distribute drugs.
In practice, the crack house statute is used primarily to prosecute private
individuals, whether owners or renters, who use their residences to distribute
controlled substances.95 But the statute has been used in more expansive
ways as well. The statute is sometimes used to prosecute owners of
marijuana dispensaries96 and has been used to prosecute landowners who
allowed their land to be used for weekend music festivals wherein drug
activity took place.97 It has been used to prosecute the owner of a car
dealership who used the company’s property to conduct drug sales.98 It has
also been used to prosecute the owner of a farm on which marijuana was
grown.99 Recently, scholars and commentators have raised concerns that the
statute could be used to prosecute operators and users at “supervised injection

94. See, e.g., United States v. Tebeau, 713 F.3d 955, 960 (8th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he ‘bare
meaning’ of the purpose requirement in § 856(a)(2) indicates that the government was not
required to prove that [defendant] had the intent to manufacture, distribute, or use a controlled
substance to convict him under the statute. [Defendant’s] reading of § 856(a)(2) to require
proof of specific intent to manufacture, distribute or use controlled substances would render it
redundant with § 856(a)(1).”); United States v. Wilson, 503 F.3d 195, 197–98 (2d Cir. 2007)
(“The phrase ‘for the purpose,’ as used in [§ 856(a)(2)], references the purpose and design not
of the person with the premises, but rather of those who are permitted to engage in drug-related
activities there.”); United States v. Banks, 987 F.2d 463, 466 (7th Cir. 1993) (“In (a)(2) the
‘purpose’ may be that of others; the defendant is liable if he manages or controls a building
that others use for an illicit purpose, and he either knows of the illegal activity or remains
deliberately ignorant of it.”); United States v. Tamez, 941 F.2d 770, 774 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[I]t
is clear that (a)(1) was intended to apply to deliberate maintenance of a place for a proscribed
purpose, whereas (a)(2) was intended to prohibit an owner from providing a place for illegal
conduct, and yet to escape liability on the basis either of lack of illegal purpose, or of deliberate
ignorance.”); Mei-Fen Chen, 913 F.2d at 190 (holding that “§ 856(a)(2) is designed to apply
to the person who may not have actually opened or maintained the place for the purpose of
drug activity, but who has knowingly allowed others to engage in those activities by making
the place ‘available for use . . . for the purpose of unlawfully’ engaging in such activity” and
that, “under § 856(a)(2), the person who manages or controls the building and then rents to
others, need not have the express purpose in doing so that drug related activity take place;
rather such activity is engaged in by others”).
95. A brief Westlaw search of recent cases citing to the statute supports this. See, e.g.,
United States v. O’Brien, 926 F.3d 57, 63–65 (2d Cir. 2019) (residence); United States v.
Chaney, 921 F.3d 572, 577–78 (6th Cir. 2019) (medical clinic); United States v. Johnson, 768
F. App’x 920, 921–22 (11th Cir. 2019) (residence); United States v. Congo, No. 2:18-cr00193-JDL, 2019 WL 2527090, at *1 (D. Me. June 19, 2019) (residence); United States v.
Spiva, No. 3:15-cr-169(2), 2019 WL 2330064, at *1–2 (S.D. Ohio May 30, 2019) (residence);
United States v. Davis, No. 5:17-CR-256-1H, 2019 WL 2202890, at *1–2 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 9,
2019) (residence); United States v. Rice, Crim. No. 17-338, 2019 WL 1449744, at *1–3 (W.D.
Pa. Apr. 2, 2019) (residence).
96. See, e.g., United States v. Lynch, 903 F.3d 1061, 1066–68 (9th Cir. 2018); United
States v. Rosenthal, 454 F.3d 943, 947–48 (9th Cir. 2006).
97. Tebeau, 713 F.3d at 957–59.
98. Tamez, 941 F.2d at 772–73.
99. United States v. Molina-Perez, 595 F.3d 854, 858–59 (8th Cir. 2010).
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facilities,”100 a harm reduction approach to the nation’s ongoing opioid
crisis.101 Neither § 856(a)(1) nor § 856(a)(2) have yet been used to prosecute
owners of online spaces, such as the operators or creators of dark net drug
marketplaces.
II. USING CONSPIRACY LAW TO PROSECUTE TYPICAL DARK NET DRUG
MARKETPLACE OPERATORS
Having laid out the bare bones of conspiracy law in the context of narcotics
laws,102 this Part will first briefly walk through the typical dark net drug
marketplace103 and then will take a closer look at the challenges of using
conspiracy law to prosecute the operators of these marketplaces.104 It will
ask whether conspiracy law, for a number of reasons, might make for a poor
conceptual fit in the prosecution of these operators. It will suggest that such
a poor fit could pose problems to the criminal justice system, especially
where a “better” statute might exist.
A. The Typical Dark Net Drug Marketplace
Dark net drug marketplaces are characterized in large part by the
anonymity they provide their users, buyers and sellers alike.105 While a wide
variety of products are available on these marketplaces, drugs are the main
products bought and sold.106 Because users are essentially anonymous, these
markets rely heavily on trust, typically built on feedback systems like user
reviews.107 Dark net drug marketplaces are far less hierarchical than normal
100. See generally, e.g., Scott Burris et al., Federalism, Policy Learning, and Local
Innovation in Public Health: The Case of the Supervised Injection Facility, 53 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 1089 (2009); Alex Kreit, Safe Injection Sites and the Federal “Crack House” Statute, 60
B.C. L. REV. 413 (2019); Amber A. Leary, Note, A Safe Harbor in the Opioid Crisis: How
the Federal Government Should Allow States to Legislate for Safe Injection Facilities in Light
of the Opioid Public Health Emergency, 84 BROOK. L. REV. 635 (2019); Cylas MartellCrawford, Note, Safe Injection Facilities: A Path to Legitimacy, 11 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 124
(2017); Melissa Vallejo, Note, Safer Bathrooms in Syringe Exchange Programs: Injecting
Progress into the Harm Reduction Movement, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1185 (2018).
101. German Lopez, Why Some U.S. Cities Are Opening Safe Spaces for Injecting Heroin,
VOX (Feb. 6, 2019, 4:40 PM), https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2018/1/25/16928144/
safe-injection-sites-heroin-opioid-epidemic [https://perma.cc/D857-SRR2].
102. See supra Part I.B.
103. See infra Part II.A.
104. See infra Part II.B.
105. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., Robert Augustus Hardy & Julia R. Norgaard, Reputation in the Internet
Black Market: An Empirical and Theoretical Analysis of the Deep Web, 12 J. INSTITUTIONAL
ECON. 515, 520 (2015) (“The codification of buyer and seller feedback makes up each party’s
user profile. A user’s feedback profile in this marketplace is made up of the comments and
ratings left on the Silk Road site as well as other feedback forums. . . . The collection of this
user feedback on other users makes up the reputation of the trader in the marketplace. . . .
Potential buyers utilize this feedback about sellers. They can read comments about previous
buyer’s experiences, whether or not the buyer received the items, and view the seller’s 30-day
and 60-day and overall rating score.” (citation omitted)); Yasmine Hassan, The Illicit Drug
Trade on the Dark Net: Analysing the Need for a New EU Framework (2017) (unpublished
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marketplaces.108 Most drug transactions that take place through dark net
drug marketplaces are purchases of small quantities of drugs for personal use,
but a significant amount of purchases are made for distribution quantities as
well.109
Although marketplaces differ on whom they cater to, who operates them,
how much commission they charge, where they are located, and what internal
rules govern them, most will be similar in a few ways. Dark net drug
marketplaces are typically created and maintained by a single person or a
small staff.110 These marketplaces primarily serve as a way to connect
buyers and sellers; marketplace operators themselves are not selling or
buying drugs.111 The operators of these marketplaces are typically
compensated by a small commission from every transaction that occurs.112
The design of these marketplaces offers significant anonymity to operators,
master’s thesis, Universiteit Leiden) (on file with author) (“Thirdly, and maybe the most
important characteristic concerns the high level of anonymity these cryptomarkets offer to
their vendors and customers. . . . [T]rustworthiness is key in these cases and this is embodied
in the significant role feedback systems play on cryptomarkets.”); Toms Reksna, Complex
Network Analysis of Darknet Black Market Forum Structure (Sept. 18, 2017) (unpublished
M.Sc. thesis, Universiteit Leiden) (on file with author).
108. Julia R. Norgaard, Harold J. Walbert & Robert Augustus Hardy, Shadow Markets and
Hierarchies: Comparing and Modeling Networks in the Dark Net, 14 J. INSTITUTIONAL ECON.
877, 894–95 (2018).
109. See, e.g., KRISTY KRUITHOF ET AL., supra note 13, at 101 (“Only 2 per cent of
transactions analysed in this study exceeded $1,000, a majority of which we conclude were
likely to be wholesale purchases. This small share of wholesale transactions, however, did
generate about a quarter of the total drugs revenues on the markets analysed. The lion’s share
of transactions on these cryptomarkets was generated by listings under $100, most likely to be
for personal use. But these retail transactions generated only 18 per cent of total revenues.
Most revenues were generated by listings priced between $100 and $500 (41 per cent).”);
Christin, supra note 26, at 25 (“[W]hile vendors on these marketplaces primarily cater in the
retail space, with individual item weights and volumes frequently corresponding to personal
amounts, there is evidence of much larger (bulk-like) sales.”).
110. See, e.g., Joshuah Bearman, The Untold Story of Silk Road, Part 1, WIRED (May
2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/04/silk-road-1/ [https://perma.cc/Y2LF-M7MA] (Silk
Road); Andrea Bellemare, The Secret Life of Alexandre Cazes, Alleged Dark Web
Mastermind, CBC NEWS (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/
alexandre-cazes-millionaire-cars-property-alphabay-1.4215894
[https://perma.cc/YQ35MN3L] (AlphaBay); Joseph Cox, The Secret Life of a Silk Road 2.0 Mastermind, VICE:
MOTHERBOARD (Mar. 10, 2016, 9:30 AM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/
3dad83/the-secret-life-of-a-silk-road-20-mastermind [https://perma.cc/HK89-GJXQ] (Silk
Road 2.0); Details Emerge of the German Administrators of Hansa Market on the Darknet,
DEUTSCHE WELLE (July 22, 2017), https://www.dw.com/en/details-emerge-of-the-germanadministrators-of-hansa-market-on-the-darknet/a-39804272 [https://perma.cc/6D2D-S5TX]
(Hansa).
111. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
112. See, e.g., Anick Jesdanun, AlphaBay: How Dark Web Marketplaces Operate Like
eBay, INDEPENDENT (July 21, 2017, 10:53 AM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/
business/news/alphabay-dark-web-marketplace-ebay-online-us-justice-department-illegaldrugs-a7852486.html [https://perma.cc/MA7V-ZUPK] (“AlphaBay took a 2 percent to 4
percent commission.”); Donna Leinwand Leger, How FBI Brought Down Cyber-Underworld
Site Silk Road, USA TODAY (May 15, 2014, 2:54 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/nation/2013/10/21/fbi-cracks-silk-road/2984921/ [https://perma.cc/5TQP-U3B6]
(“The FBI estimates that Silk Road’s operator made $80 million in commissions from the
site’s users . . . .”).
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buyers, and sellers because they are accessible only through browsers like
Tor and using payment methods like Bitcoin that do not require conventional
banking.113 Buyers can leave feedback on sellers,114 but buyer-buyer
communication,
seller-seller
communication,
and
buyer-seller
communication outside of transactions are rare, as is communication between
the operator and any user.115 The buyers’ goal is typically to obtain drugs
for personal use or for resale; the sellers’ goal is typically monetary gain; and
the operators’ goal is typically to earn commission through transactions that
take place on the marketplace, the vast majority of which are drug sales.116
B. Critiques of Charging the Typical Dark Net Drug Marketplace Operator
with Conspiracy to Distribute Narcotics
This subsection will detail a variety of reasons why the conspiracy to
distribute narcotics charge may not be a good fit for prosecuting the operator
of the typical dark net drug marketplace described above. The first potential
problem with the conspiracy charge is that the relationships between the
alleged conspirators will typically resemble not a single conspiracy, as was
alleged in the Ulbricht case, but a “rimless hub-and-spoke conspiracy,”
which under U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence will consist of many different
conspiracies rather than a single one.117 Second, it is unclear whether users
of the marketplace know about or intend to join the other users in a wideranging, single conspiracy.118 Third, there exists what this Note will term
the “eBay problem,” which is that distinguishing dark net drug marketplaces
from legitimate marketplaces, while seemingly easy at first glance, becomes
a difficult problem as the facts change.119 Finally, the public policy goals
that justify the conspiracy charge are not as apparent as applied to dark net
drug marketplace cases.120
1. The “Rimless Hub-and-Spoke” Problem
In Kotteakos v. United States,121 the Supreme Court considered the case of
three defendants convicted of fraudulently obtaining loans under the National
Housing Act.122 Brown, who pleaded guilty and was not a party to this case,
was the central figure in the fraudulent scheme and provided fraudulent loans
under the Act for others.123 The defendants knowingly submitted fraudulent
113. See generally DePiero, supra note 51.
114. See supra note 107.
115. See, e.g., United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“As
website administrator, Ulbricht may have had some direct contact with some users of the site,
and none with most.”).
116. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
117. See generally Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
118. See infra Part II.B.2.
119. See infra Part II.B.3.
120. See infra Part II.B.4.
121. 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
122. Id. at 752.
123. Id. at 752–55.
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loan applications prepared by Brown and were indicted for a single
conspiracy amongst themselves, Brown, and twenty-eight other people.124
On appeal, the Kotteakos defendants challenged the discrepancy between
what was alleged in the indictment, a single conspiracy, and what they argued
the government proved at trial, separate conspiracies between Brown and
each of the individuals he prepared fraudulent loans applications for.125
The Supreme Court held that this discrepancy was fatal to the indictment,
reversed the convictions, and remanded for further proceedings.126 The
government stated that the relationship between Brown and the others in the
conspiracy was “that of separate spokes meeting in a common center,”127 to
which the Court added, “without the rim of the wheel to enclose the
spokes.”128 In considering the relationships between Brown and the
defendants in light of the conspiracy statute they were charged under, the
Court stated that it did not think that “Congress . . . intended to authorize the
Government to string together, for common trial, eight or more separate and
distinct crimes, conspiracies related in kind though they might be, when the
only nexus among them lies in the fact that one man participated in all.”129
The parallels between the relationships between Brown and the Kotteakos
defendants and dark net drug operators and their users are compelling.
Brown acted as a central figure in the loan scheme and prepared the
fraudulent loans for the other persons listed in the indictment. Drug
marketplace operators, like Ulbricht, are the central figures in the typical
marketplace, often creating the website and maintaining it.130 Brown took a
5 percent commission,131 similar to the commissions taken by the operators
of these marketplaces.132 Little connected the non-Brown members of the
Kotteakos conspiracy to each other; little connects the assorted dealers on the
typical dark net drug marketplace aside from their shared online location. In
short, the relationship between the typical dark net drug marketplace
operators and their users closely resembles the “rimless” hub-and-spoke
structure that the Kotteakos Court condemned—many individual operatoruser relationships but little connecting the individual users together to
suggest a single, all-encompassing conspiracy.
In United States v. Ulbricht,133 the court stated in its denial of the
defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment that “[o]f course, ultimately,
the form of the conspiracy is not as important as a determination that at least
one other person joined in the alleged conspiratorial agreement with
Ulbricht.”134 Additionally, it found that this “multiple conspiracy” issue did
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
Id. at 752–56.
Id. at 777.
Id. at 755.
Id.
Id. at 773.
See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 753.
See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
31 F. Supp. 3d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
Id. at 557.
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not prejudice the defendant where he, the “hub” of the conspiracy, was the
sole defendant.135 While the Kotteakos Court was concerned in part with the
prejudice suffered by “non-hub” coconspirators like the defendants in that
case,136 and not “hub” conspirators like Brown, prosecutors invite risk by
alleging a thousand-person conspiracy in the typical marketplace case, as the
prosecution in the Ulbricht case did.137
2. The “Agreement” Element
The court’s opinion in Ulbricht is similarly instructive in teasing out issues
concerning the temporal scope of the typical dark net drug marketplace
conspiracy. In denying the motion to dismiss the indictment, the court stated
that it was possible that Ulbricht, by designing and operating the Silk Road,
effectively posted a sign on a worldwide bulletin board, which advertised an
anonymous, untraceable way to traffic narcotics.138 As a matter of law, the
court ruled, it is possible that each user of the website became a coconspirator
at the moment he or she used the website.139 Citing United States v.
Borelli,140 the court stated that courts have long recognized that members of
a conspiracy may join the conspiracy at different times.141
This question of temporal proximity concerns all typical dark net drug
marketplaces, which are created first by a single person or small group of
people and then are later joined by users.142 But while the bulletin board in
Ulbricht might suffice to join a later user to an operator, it fails to join later
users to both prior users and later users—that is, even taken as a given that
the typical drug seller on a dark net drug marketplace joins into a conspiracy
with the operator at the moment the seller joins the site, nothing would seem
to bind him or her to other users. There is reciprocity in the operator-seller
relationship that lends itself to a conspiratorial understanding. Operators
provide the anonymous platforms on which the untraceable transactions may
occur, and buyers and sellers pay commission for the use of the platform. No
such reciprocity exists at the seller-seller level.
This problem is closely related to the “rimless hub-and-spoke” problem143
but compounded by the “pre-programmed,” asynchronous nature of the

135. United States v. Ulbricht, No. 14-cr-68 (KBF), 2015 WL 413426, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y.
2015) (denying a request to instruct the jury on “multiple conspiracies” and citing to case law
that held, “[e]ven if there were two conspiracies, . . . the fact that only a single conspiracy was
charged did not and could not have prejudiced the defendant by spillover or otherwise”
(quoting United States v. Corey, 566 F.2d 429, 431 n.3 (2d Cir. 1977))).
136. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 774 (“The dangers for transference of guilt from one to another
across the line separating conspiracies, subconsciously or otherwise, are so great that no one
really can say prejudice to substantial right has not taken place.”).
137. Superseding Indictment, supra note 60, at 4–7.
138. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 558.
139. Id.
140. 336 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1964).
141. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 558 (citing Borelli, 336 F.2d at 383–84).
142. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
143. See supra Part II.B.1.
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agreement posited by the court in Ulbricht.144 The hypothetical agreement
is made in two pieces: first by the operator at the creation of the marketplace
and his continued maintenance of it, and then by the user at the moment of
his or her use of the marketplace.145 Such an agreement is premised at least
in part on the reciprocal benefits each party earns, but no such reciprocity
exists between the different sellers on the site. The Ulbricht indictment
alleged a conspiracy including Ulbricht and thousands of other dealers146—
each seller on the site, then, must be proved to have intended to join such a
conspiracy. While the bulletin board metaphor makes sense in the operatorseller relationship, it fails to establish a cognizable basis for the thousands of
seller-seller relationships that the single conspiracy formation requires.
3. The “eBay Problem”
One problem inherent in the prosecution of dark net drug marketplace
operators with the conspiracy charge is that typical drug marketplaces share
a bevy of similarities with legitimate online marketplaces like eBay. eBay,
like many dark net drug marketplaces, is an online marketplace on which
buyers and vendors may buy or sell almost anything.147 Both platforms
charge commissions.148 And both have a relatively nonhierarchical shape
and are owned and operated by a person or group much smaller than their
vast user populations.149 A charge that prohibits the operation of an online
drug marketplace while posing no threat to operators of legitimate
marketplaces thus becomes very desirable.
It is instructive to illustrate what differentiates the two. Typical dark net
drug marketplaces are found on the dark net, accessible only through
software that provides a high level of anonymity, whereas eBay is located on
the surface web, accessible by anyone with an internet connection.150 The
majority of products found on the typical dark net drug marketplace are
controlled substances, whereas eBay features only a small amount of illicit
sales, which are prohibited and policed.151 Dark net drug marketplaces offer
even greater anonymity through the use of cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin,
144. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 558–59.
145. See, e.g., id. at 558 (“On Day 1 . . . Ulbricht ‘offers’ to work with others to traffic
illegal narcotics . . . . He makes this offer by creating and launching a website specifically
designed and intended for such unlawful purposes. Ulbricht’s continued operation of the site
evinces an enduring intent to be bound with those who ‘accept’ his offer and utilize the site
for its intended purpose. . . . Each time someone ‘signs up’ and agrees to Ulbricht’s standing
offer, it is possible that, as a matter of law, he or she may become a coconspirator.”).
146. Superseding Indictment, supra note 60, at 1–3.
147. Our Company, EBAY, https://www.ebayinc.com/our-company/ [https://perma.cc/
ZJ3P-6WH9] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
148. Selling Fees, EBAY, https://www.ebay.com/help/selling/fees-credits-invoices/sellingfees?id=4364 [https://perma.cc/UT8L-EKYT] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
149. See eBay, Inc., eBay Inc. Reports First Quarter 2018 Results, PR NEWSWIRE (Apr. 25,
2018),
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/ebay-inc-reports-first-quarter-2018results-300636638.html [https://perma.cc/M6M6-K278]; supra note 108 and accompanying
text.
150. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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whereas eBay accepts only legal tender.152 Finally, the operator of a typical
dark net drug marketplace intends to use his or her marketplace as a space
for drug transactions, while legitimate marketplaces like eBay presumably
intend to turn a profit and conform with the laws and regulations that apply
to them. The first three differences—the anonymity provided by the dark
net, the products bought and sold on the market, and the payment methods
accepted—are mostly differences in degree, not kind. The fourth—the intent
behind the operator’s design and maintenance of the market—is what truly
differentiates legitimate marketplaces like eBay from illegitimate ones. The
final difference-in-kind will offer useful insight as to how law enforcement
might approach marketplace-level enforcement through the crack house
statute.
First, dark net drug marketplaces, through their design and their location
on the dark net, offer a high level of anonymity to their users.153 That said,
the anonymity is not absolute. Law enforcement is sometimes able to use
conventional investigative techniques to identify buyers, sellers, and
operators of such marketplaces.154 Ross Ulbricht, for example, was
identified in part by a Silk Road administrator’s cooperation with federal
authorities after they had learned the administrator’s identity.155 Servers for
such marketplaces exist in the real world and, should they be discovered, law
enforcement may be able to identify people who have connected with the
server.156 Similarly, while legitimate marketplaces like eBay offer little
anonymity to users, they do not offer complete transparency. eBay users,
like dark net users, use personalized usernames.157 Users do not have to use
their full name as their eBay ID.158 For most purposes, eBay sellers are
“anonymous” in that a casual browser would not be able to determine the
152. See Accepted Payments Policy, EBAY, https://www.ebay.com/help/policies/paymentpolicies/accepted-payments-policy?id=4269 [https://perma.cc/Q997-ZG2N] (last visited Aug.
22, 2019).
153. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
154. See, e.g., Sarah Volpenhein, Dark Web Poses Challenges for Law Enforcement,
GOV’T TECH. (Aug. 10, 2015), https://www.govtech.com/gov-experience/Dark-Web-PosesChallenges-for-Law-Enforcement.html [https://perma.cc/YCD6-YEDX] (“[A] misstep . . .
led Homeland Security Investigations to a Portland, Ore., man, who has pending drug
conspiracy charges against him in U.S. District Court in Grand Forks. . . . [That defendant’s]
mistake was he allegedly used the same username . . . on a legitimate messaging service called
KIK as he did on the illegitimate Dark Web site, Evolution, where he allegedly sold drugs . . . .
[A]gents were able to subpoena KIK and ask for subscriber information, which had Hubbard’s
IP address. Agents then used the IP address to find his identity from his Internet provider.”).
155. Ryan Mac & Runa Sandvik, Meet the Silk Road Employee That the Dread Pirate
Roberts Allegedly Tried to Murder, FORBES (Nov. 8, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/ryanmac/2013/11/08/meet-the-silk-road-employee-that-the-dread-pirate-robertsallegedly-tried-to-murder [https://perma.cc/2C2P-VQ8M].
156. See, e.g., Andy Greenberg, Operation Bayonet: Inside the Sting That Hijacked an
Entire Dark Web Drug Market, WIRED (Mar. 8, 2018, 11:30 AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/hansa-dutch-police-sting-operation/ [https://perma.cc/2A8FWYKV].
157. Username Policy, EBAY, https://www.ebay.com/help/policies/identity-policies/
username-policy?id=4235 [https://perma.cc/BP8D-T7KK] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
158. See id.
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identities of buyers or sellers. Law enforcement typically has to issue a
subpoena to access the information eBay has stored on individual
accounts.159 The level of anonymity the dark net provides—strong, but not
total—is higher than legitimate websites like eBay, which provide weak, but
not zero, anonymity to users.
Second, while the majority of transactions on dark net drug marketplaces
are drug sales,160 some legitimate transactions do occur. For example, the
popular marketplace AlphaBay hosted primarily digital goods and nonnarcotics sales prior to the takedown of other dark net drug marketplaces.161
Even marketplaces like the Silk Road, while primarily used for drug
transactions, hosted a large number of legitimate transactions.162 Legitimate
marketplaces like eBay and Amazon, on the other hand, are no strangers to
illicit transactions.163 While illicit transactions on legitimate marketplaces
may be the exception rather than the rule, it is beyond argument that they can
and have occurred. The majority of transactions on dark net drug
marketplaces involve narcotics, but legitimate transactions can and do occur.
Third, dark net drug marketplaces generally only accept cryptocurrencies
like Bitcoin.164 Cryptocurrencies enhance the anonymity these platforms
provide, as they are not tied to traditional financial structures like banks,
whose records can be subpoenaed by law enforcement.165 While
cryptocurrencies do typically grant a higher level of anonymity than
traditional payment methods, they are not absolutely untraceable. The nature
of the technology behind cryptocurrencies means that a single Bitcoin, for
instance, can be tracked through the blockchain over time.166 Additionally,
the anonymity provided by cryptocurrencies is only as strong as their holder’s
159. Currently eBay requires law enforcement to use its “Law Enforcement eRequest
System,” which requires law enforcement to register to use the portal to submit legal requests.
See
Law
Enforcement
eRequest
System,
EBAY,
https://le.corp.ebay.com/
leportal_communitieslogin [https://perma.cc/3T2H-H7VJ] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
Previously, eBay requested law enforcement to fill out and fax a records request. Responding
to Law Enforcement Record Requests, EBAY, https://info.publicintelligence.net/
ebayrequests.pdf [https://perma.cc/4M3F-7HXY] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
160. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
161. Christin, supra note 26, at 12–13 (“AlphaBay did primarily start as a digital goods
business, and then, when the (then-leading) Evolution marketplace went down in March 2015,
started picking up narcotics traffic; after the Agora marketplace shut down in August 2015,
the uptick in traffic is even more significant.”).
162. Christin, supra note 5, at 8–9.
163. NHS Prescription Drugs Being Sold Illegally by Patients, BBC NEWS (Jan. 16, 2017),
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-birmingham-38560041
[https://perma.cc/7AJGJL5V]; Ford Vox, Amazon’s Illegal Drug Dealing, SLATE (May 29, 2014, 8:46 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/medical_examiner/2014/05/amazon_illega
l_drugs_muscle_relaxants_steroids_prescription_drugs_delivered.html
[https://perma.cc/
YX6M-B44D].
164. Soska & Christin, supra note 5, at 34 (“[M]odern online anonymous markets . . . use
pseudonymous online currencies as payment systems (e.g., Bitcoin).”).
165. See supra note 113.
166. See, e.g., Andy Greenberg, Follow the Bitcoins: How We Got Busted Buying Drugs
on Silk Road’s Black Market, FORBES (Sept. 5, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
andygreenberg/2013/09/05/follow-the-bitcoins-how-we-got-busted-buying-drugs-on-silkroads-black-market [https://perma.cc/NBG3-V23B].
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password, or “private key.”167 Should that password be compromised, the
security and anonymity granted by the cryptocurrency is similarly
compromised.168 eBay, on the other hand, does not yet take cryptocurrency,
like Bitcoin, as a payment.169 That said, eBay is contemplating adopting
Bitcoin as a valid payment method,170 and across platforms there has been
an explosion in interest in permitting cryptocurrencies to be used as valid
forms of payment.171
Aside from these differences in degree, the fourth difference between dark
net drug marketplaces is one in kind—the operator’s intent. While the
operators and owners of legitimate marketplaces intend to operate within the
boundaries of applicable laws and regulations, the intent behind most dark
net drug marketplaces is to operate a space for distribution of drugs.172 The
Ulbricht indictment, for example, alleged such an intent,173 and the court’s
opinion denying the motion to dismiss the indictment described why the
intent element was so important.174 It is plausible that such an intent can be
shown by the volume of drug sales on most dark net marketplaces and the
commissions their operators are earning. The guidelines and policies that
legitimate marketplaces typically put in place to prevent illicit transactions
bolster this distinction.175 Dark net drug marketplaces, as evidenced by the
sheer volume of drug transactions they host,176 obviously have no such
policies or interest in enforcing them. This intent difference, then, offers the
only real categorical distinction between the typical legitimate marketplace
like eBay and the typical dark net drug marketplaces like the Silk Road,
Hansa, or AlphaBay. A charge for which intent is at the forefront, then, may
be preferable to one like conspiracy, which requires jurors to find intent

167. Adrianne Jeffries, How to Steal Bitcoin in Three Easy Steps, VERGE (Dec. 19, 2013,
1:10 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2013/12/19/5183356/how-to-steal-bitcoin-in-threeeasy-steps [https://perma.cc/24CQ-ABD7].
168. Id.
169. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
170. Jen Rogers, eBay Is ‘Seriously Considering’ Accepting Bitcoin, YAHOO FIN. (Dec. 12,
2017),
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/ebay-seriously-considering-accepting-bitcoin164410989.html [https://perma.cc/9L8E-FV3S].
171. See, e.g., Joseph Young, Retailer Adoption of Bitcoin Is Growing in the US and
Canada, Despite Price Fall, CCN (Apr. 7, 2018), https://www.ccn.com/retailer-adoption-ofbitcoin-is-growing-in-the-us-and-canada-despite-price-fall/ [https://perma.cc/D4F7-ZWG6].
172. See supra Part II.A.
173. Superseding Indictment, supra note 60, at 2–3.
174. United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Ulbricht is
alleged to have knowingly and intentionally constructed and operated an expansive black
market for selling and purchasing narcotics and malicious software and for laundering money.
This separates Ulbricht’s alleged conduct from the mass of others whose websites may—
without their planning or expectation—be used for unlawful purposes.”).
175. See, e.g., Prohibited and Restricted Items, EBAY, https://www.ebay.com/help/
policies/prohibited-restricted-items/prohibited-restricted-items?id=4207 [https://perma.cc/
PZR9-Q7UK] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019); Restricted Products, AMAZON SELLER CENT.,
https:// sellercentral.amazon.com/gp/help/external/200164330?language=en-US&ref=mpbc_
200277040_cont_200164330 [https://perma.cc/J94Z-XJJK] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
176. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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amongst a host of other elements like agreement, illegal objective, the span
and scope of the alleged conspiracy, and how many conspiracies in fact exist.
4. The Policy Goals of the Standalone Conspiracy Law May Not Apply
Finally, the policy reasons for a standalone conspiracy charge do not apply
as forcefully in the dark net drug marketplace context as they do in the typical
hierarchical narcotics conspiracy. The chief reason for the standalone
conspiracy charge is that conspiracies pose greater dangers to the public than
would be possible if individual actors simply acted alone.177 This is true in
the typical complex narcotics conspiracy, which might include a person who
creates a controlled substance in a laboratory, who then delivers the pure
product to a few wholesalers, who then distribute a diluted product to street
sellers, who then employ lookouts and middlemen—and a money launderer
cleans the proceeds for various members. Each actor serves as a cog in the
larger hierarchy, and each role is indispensable to the organization and
furthers the end goal of narcotics distribution.178
The typical dark net drug marketplace is much less hierarchical,179 and
therefore the group danger element, which society seeks to deter through a
standalone conspiracy charge, loses much of its force. The hierarchy in the
typical marketplace consists of an operator who creates and maintains the
site, with sellers and buyers transacting with each other on the platform and

177. Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593–94 (1961) (“Concerted action both
increases the likelihood that the criminal object will be successfully attained and decreases the
probability that the individuals involved will depart from their path of criminality. Group
association for criminal purposes often, if not normally, makes possible the attainment of ends
more complex than those which one criminal could accomplish. Nor is the danger of a
conspiratorial group limited to the particular end toward which it has embarked. Combination
in crime makes more likely the commission of crimes unrelated to the original purpose for
which the group was formed.”); Note, The Conspiracy Dilemma: Prosecutions of Group
Crime or Protection of Individual Defendants, 62 HARV. L. REV. 276, 283–84 (1948) (“[T]he
crucial importance of the conspiracy weapon stems from its effectiveness in reaching
organized crime. The advantages of division of labor and complex organization characteristic
of modern economic society have their counterparts in many forms of criminal activity.
Manufacture or importation and distribution of contraband goods, for example, often demands
a complicated organization. The interrelations of the parties in schemes to defraud may be
highly complex.”).
178. See, e.g., United States v. Giry, 818 F.2d 120, 127 (1st Cir. 1987) (“A scheme to
manufacture and distribute a large quantity of illicit drugs involves a great many discrete steps
and includes a large number of people, most of whom know few of the other participants in
the scheme. . . . [T]he federal courts have adopted [a] view, permitting the entire scheme to
be characterized as a single conspiracy and treating each discrete step as one of the links in an
indivisible chain.”); United States v. Warner, 690 F.2d 545, 549 (6th Cir. 1982) (“Conspiracies
to distribute narcotics, which normally involve numerous sales and resales of drugs until they
reach the ultimate consumers, are often ‘chain’ conspiracies.”); United States v. Agueci, 310
F.2d 817, 826 (2d Cir. 1962) (“The ‘chain’ conspiracy has as its ultimate purpose the placing
of the forbidden commodity into the hands of the ultimate purchaser. That form of conspiracy
is dictated by a division of labor at the various functional levels—exportation . . . and
importation . . . adulteration and packaging, distribution to reliable sellers, and ultimately the
sale to the narcotics user.” (citation omitted)).
179. See supra note 108.
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paying a commission to the operator.180 Some staff or administrators may
help the normal function of the marketplace, but the structure of the
“conspiracy” includes only the party providing the platform, the party using
the platform to sell, and the party using the platform to purchase.
Despite being less hierarchical, dark net drug marketplaces do pose unique
dangers. While the conspiracy’s special danger is its ability to compound
harm via multiple, coordinating actors,181 the dark net drug marketplace’s
special danger is its nature as a near-anonymous place where users across the
world can buy and sell controlled substances.182 The special danger of the
conspiracy is addressed by the advantages that the conspiracy charge carries
with it.183 The advantages of the conspiracy charge are aimed towards that
particular danger, and its use becomes less justifiable in the case of the typical
dark net drug marketplace operator, whose most culpable behavior is creating
a near-anonymous, wide-reaching platform mostly outside of the reach of
law enforcement.
Another reason for the standalone conspiracy charge is the secrecy that
conspiracies naturally cloak themselves in.184 But here, too, the force of the
policy is weaker in the typical dark net drug marketplace than in the typical
narcotics conspiracy. Dark net drug marketplaces operate openly online—a
simple Google search turns up a list of markets, and tutorials as to how to
access those markets are available freely as well.185 The anonymity provided
by the dark net is a function of the design of Tor-like browsers and difficultto-trace currencies like Bitcoin,186 neither of which are illegal on their own.
There is nothing inherently secretive in the marketplace-seller-buyer
relationship.
III. THE “CRACK HOUSE” STATUTE—TAILORED FOR ONLINE DRUG
MARKETS
21 U.S.C. § 856 criminalizes the type of behavior operators of dark net
drug marketplaces engage in. This Part will argue that a plain reading of the
statute permits the prosecution of such operators through the statute,

180. See supra Part II.A.
181. See supra notes 177–78.
182. See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 40–44 and accompanying text.
184. United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915) (“For two or more to confederate
and combine together to commit or cause to be committed a breach of the criminal laws, is an
offense of the gravest character . . . . [I]t is characterized by secrecy, rendering it difficult of
detection, requiring more time for its discovery, and adding to the importance of punishing it
when discovered.”).
185. See, e.g., Ofir Beigel, Accessing the Darknet, Dark Web and Deep Web in Under 2
Minutes—Beginner’s Guide, 99BITCOINS, https://99bitcoins.com/accessing-dark-net-underminutes-beginners-guide [https://perma.cc/2B6D-LLNE] (last updated July 6, 2019); Paul
Bischoff, Step by Step Guide to Safely Accessing the Dark Net and Deep Web, COMPARITECH
(Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.comparitech.com/blog/vpn-privacy/how-to-access-the-deepweb-and-darknet/ [https://perma.cc/5U37-YXQV].
186. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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sometimes termed the “crack house” statute.187 In doing so it will examine
the word “place,” argue that the statute’s legislative history leaves open the
possibility of its use in prosecuting such operators,188 suggest that law
enforcement is in need of tools to reduce the availability of controlled
substances given the current opioid crisis,189 answer why such a novel
approach is preferable to the conspiracy charge, and finally conclude by
addressing likely counterarguments.
While the crack house statute’s use in this context is novel, there is a
history of tension between technological advances and statutory law.
Scholars have long argued that instead of waiting for legislatures to revise
laws upon every new technological advance, courts should allow for statutes
to cover situations that may not have been contemplated by their drafters due
to advances in technology.190 Criminal statutes have been employed to
address new technologies in a variety of ways throughout history.191 Though
a prosecution of a dark net drug marketplace operator with the crack house
statute would be the first prosecution of its kind, it would continue a long line
of similar statutes adapting to modern use.
A. A Realistic Solution
The problems with charging the typical dark net drug marketplace operator
with a single conspiracy encompassing all of the users of his or her site can
be summarized as follows: (1) the structure alleged, instead of forming a
single conspiracy, actually forms a rimless hub-and-spoke structure which
creates not a single conspiracy but many separate operator-seller-buyer
conspiracies;192 (2) given the rimless hub-and-spoke structure that fails to tie
users together, there are serious issues concerning the conspiracy each user
187. See infra Part III.B.
188. See infra Part III.B.
189. See infra Part III.C.
190. See, e.g., Gregory E. Perry & Cherie Ballard, A Chip by Any Other Name Would Still
Be a Potato: The Failure of Law and Its Definitions to Keep Pace with Computer Technology,
24 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 797, 801–02 (1993); Keith A. Christiansen, Note, Technological
Change and Statutory Interpretation, 1968 WIS. L. REV. 556, 557.
191. See, e.g., Ellen S. Podgor, “What Kind of a Mad Prosecutor” Brought Us This White
Collar Case, 41 VT. L. REV. 523, 524–26 (2017) (criticizing, but recognizing, prosecutorial
“statute stretching” in the fraud, obstruction of justice, and bribery realms); Jed. S. Rakoff,
The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771, 772–73 (1980) (“[T]he mail
fraud statute, together with its lineal descendant, the wire fraud statute, has been characterized
as the ‘first line of defense’ against virtually every new area of fraud to develop in the United
States in the past century. . . . In many . . . areas, where legislatures have sometimes been
slow to enact specific prohibitory legislation, the mail fraud statute has frequently represented
the sole instrument of justice that could be wielded against the ever-innovative practitioners
of deceit.”); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, California Operator of myRedBook.com
Website Pleads Guilty to Facilitating Prostitution (Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/california-operator-myredbookcom-website-pleads-guilty-facilitating-prostitution
[https://perma.cc/2NJA-8AKD] (announcing that the operator of website that hosted
advertisements posted by prostitutes pleaded guilty to using a facility of interstate commerce
with the intent to facilitate prostitution, “represent[ing] the first federal conviction of a website
operator for facilitation of prostitution”).
192. See supra Part II.B.1.
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is agreeing to, especially considering the “automated agreement”
contemplated by the Ulbricht court;193 (3) the public policy purposes for the
standalone conspiracy charge do not apply as forcefully to the online drug
marketplace as they would to a typical narcotics conspiracy;194 and (4) the
operator’s intent is the main thing separating the typical dark net drug
marketplace operator from the operator or director of a legitimate online
marketplace like eBay or Amazon.195
While the conspiracy charge is a poor conceptual fit for the behavior
engaged in by the typical dark net drug marketplace operator, prosecutors
should be encouraged to charge that behavior under laws that do proscribe it.
A statute explicitly prohibiting this behavior would be ideal, such as a statute
that criminalizes the creation and operation of a website which is designed as
a safe haven for drug dealers and purchasers. Such a statute would avoid
most of the difficulties specific to the conspiracy charge discussed above.
Rimless hub-and-spoke issues wash away where no proof of conspiracy is
needed. Any agreements the alleged members of the conspiracy may or may
not have made would be irrelevant, as would be the temporal proximity of
those agreements; only the conduct and intent of the operator would matter.
Any concerns about the conspiracy charge’s public policy goals not being
met in the dark net context would fade away where a standalone conspiracy
charge is not used. While the eBay problem is endemic to any sort of criminal
prosecution of an operator of an online marketplace, because the main
difference between legitimate and illegitimate marketplaces is the intent of
the operator, the hypothetical statute would place intent at the forefront of the
charge. That intent, instead of being tangled up in the knowledge, agreement,
objective, and overt act elements of the conspiracy charge, would become
nearly the only factual issue jurors must resolve.
B. A Plain Text Reading Permits Prosecutions of This Type
21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) makes it a crime to “knowingly . . . maintain any
place, whether permanently or temporarily, for the purpose of . . .
distributing . . . any controlled substance,” while 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2)
makes it a crime to “manage or control any place . . . and knowingly and
intentionally . . . profit from . . . the place for the purpose of unlawfully . . .
distributing . . . a controlled substance.”196 The text, on its face, appears to
prohibit the type of conduct that the typical dark net drug marketplace
operator engages in so long as an internet platform qualifies as a “place.”
Either subsection could apply to the conduct of the typical dark net drug
marketplace operator. The first, which courts have interpreted to require the
intent to distribute a controlled substance,197 could apply to operators who,
through their creation and maintenance of the marketplace, fully intend it to
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

See supra Part II.B.2.
See supra Part II.B.4.
See supra Part II.B.3.
21 U.S.C. § 856 (2012).
See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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facilitate the distribution of controlled substances, as was alleged in the
Ulbricht indictment.198 The second, which courts have interpreted to require
a lesser showing of intent—generally that the defendant intended to make the
place available while knowing that distribution of controlled substances
occurred therein199—could be charged where issues of fact exist as to the
operator’s intent.
The main issue in using the crack house statute to charge the operators of
dark net drug marketplaces is that the statute prohibits only maintaining a
“place,” without defining what a “place” is.200 There are no reported cases
in which prosecutors charged that the maintenance or creation of an online
place was in violation of the statute. Merriam-Webster defines “place” as a
“physical environment; a way for admission or transit; physical
surroundings; an indefinite region; a particular region, center of population,
or location,” among others.201 Referring to online locations as “places” is
not unheard of in popular culture.202 Absent a conclusive indication based
on its plain meaning, other areas of law can perhaps be useful to analyze
whether “place” should extend to online platforms.
Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act203 (ADA) prohibits
discrimination “on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of
the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of
any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or
leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.”204 The First,
Second, and Seventh Circuits have left open the possibility of extending the
definition of “place” in the ADA to online platforms.205 Several courts,
198. Superseding Indictment, supra note 60, at 2–3.
199. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
200. 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1)–(2).
201. Place, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/place
[https://perma.cc/V3XY-MXXF] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
202. See, e.g., Theodora Blanchfield, The 10 Happiest Places on the Internet, DAILY BURN
(Aug. 15, 2016), https://dailyburn.com/life/lifestyle/happiness-best-apps-websites/ [https://
perma.cc/3DDW-G3XK]; Candice Darden, 16 of the Most Beautifully Odd & Useful Places
on the Internet That You Didn’t Know Existed, HELLO GIGGLES (Aug. 18, 2016, 5:51 PM),
https://hellogiggles.com/lifestyle/technology/beautifully-odd-places-internet-didnt-knowexisted/ [https://perma.cc/FP7G-UQRA]; Leanna Garfield, The 8 Creepiest Places on the
Internet, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 31, 2015, 1:36 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/the-8creepiest-places-on-the-internet-2015-10 [https://perma.cc/EG8V-WLQS]; Max Knoblach, 9
Absolutely Petrifying Places on the Internet, MASHABLE (Oct. 15, 2013),
https://mashable.com/2013/10/15/scary-internet/#Eh3rJYD1HZqO [https://perma.cc/A5LTK3DY]; Christopher Null, The 15 Best Places to Waste Time on the Web, PCWORLD (Dec.
13, 2006, 1:00 AM), https://www.pcworld.com/article/128122/article.html [https://
perma.cc/9M9L-5J2T].
203. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181–12189 (2012).
204. Id. § 12182(a) (emphasis added).
205. Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Title III’s mandate
that the disabled be accorded ‘full and equal enjoyment of the goods, [and] services . . . of any
place of public accommodation,’ suggests to us that the statute was meant to guarantee them
more than mere physical access.” (citation omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a))); Doe v.
Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1999) (“The core meaning of this
provision, plainly enough, is that the owner of a store, hotel, restaurant, . . . Web site, or other
facility (whether in physical space or in electronic space) that is open to the public cannot
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however, have held that the ADA speaks only to physical locations or that
for a nonphysical place to be covered under the ADA, there needs to be some
nexus between the nonphysical place and a physical one.206 Scholars
concerned with the ADA’s applicability to online places have argued for its
applicability,207 against its applicability,208 or commented on the confused
state of courts in this realm, arguing instead for executive branch guidance.209
A more problematic issue in applying the crack house statute to online
places concerns the heading of 21 U.S.C. § 856, “Maintaining Drug-Involved
Premises.”210 The word “premises,” as compared to the ambiguous “place,”
denotes more strongly a physical location. Merriam-Webster defines
premises as “a tract of land with the buildings thereon; a building or part of
a building usually with its appurtenances (such as grounds).”211 The
Cambridge Dictionary defines premises as “a house or other building and the
land on which it is built.”212 Courts may use statutory titles and section
headings in interpreting the meaning of statutes.213 However, using titles and
headings to interpret a statute will usually only be permissible when the text
exclude disabled persons from entering the facility.” (citation omitted)); Carparts Distribution
Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesalers Ass’n of New Eng. Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding
that a travel service without a physical location could be covered under the Act, as “[i]t would
be irrational to conclude that persons who enter an office to purchase services are protected
by the ADA, but persons who purchase the same services over the telephone or by mail are
not” and that “Congress could not have intended such an absurd result”); see also Victoria
Smith Ekstrand, Democratic Governance, Self-Fulfillment and Disability: Web Accessibility
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the First Amendment, 22 COMM. L. & POL’Y
427, 440–48 (2017) (summarizing current ADA law).
206. Earll v. eBay, Inc., 599 F. App’x 695, 696 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Because eBay’s services
are not connected to any ‘actual, physical place[ ],’ eBay is not subject to the ADA.”); Access
Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1335 (11th Cir. 2004) (stating that while “Title
III’s applicability to web sites—either because web sites are themselves places of public
accommodation or because they have a sufficient nexus to such physical places of public
accommodation—is a matter of first impression before this Court,” the instant case was not
the proper time to answer such a question); Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006,
1014 (6th Cir. 1997) (“The clear connotation of the words in § 12181(7) is that a public
accommodation is a physical place.”); see also Ekstrand, supra note 205 (summarizing the
case law).
207. See, e.g., Shani Else, Note, Courts Must Welcome the Reality of the Modern World:
Cyberspace Is a Place Under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 65 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1121, 1157–58 (2008).
208. See, e.g., Michael O. Finnigan, Jr. et al., Comment, Accommodating Cyberspace:
Application of the Americans with Disabilities Act to the Internet, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1795,
1825–26 (2007).
209. See, e.g., Arjeta Albani, Note, Equality in the Age of the Internet: Websites Under
Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 13 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 97, 115–16 (2017).
210. 21 U.S.C. § 856 (2012).
211. Premise, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/premise
[https://perma.cc/4FJM-XYQ4] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
212. Premises, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/
english/premises [https://perma.cc/VGL3-GEQP] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
213. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 234 (1998); see also Church of
the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 462 (1892) (“Among other things which may
be considered in determining the intent of the legislature is the title of the act. We do not mean
that it may be used to add to or take from the body of the statute, but it may help to interpret
its meaning.” (citation omitted)).
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of the statute itself is ambiguous.214 Based on the arguments discussed
above, the word “place” is not necessarily ambiguous and can support a broad
definition extending to nonphysical locations without necessitating analysis
of the statute’s title.
Assuming that “place” can apply to online platforms, applying the crack
house statute to dark net drug marketplace operators becomes somewhat
straightforward. First the prosecution would have to show that the operator
“maintained” the place—in subsection (a)(1) cases, the prosecution could
even show the operator “opened” the place. In crack house statute
prosecutions, maintenance might be shown in a variety of ways, including
through possession of the place, dominion or control over the place,
protecting the place, and making repairs to the place.215 The typical dark net
drug marketplace operator designs the website, acts as administrator, reaps
the commissions for transactions that occur on the website, and might make
repairs to the code of the website—all of which would clearly evidence
maintenance. Second, the prosecution would have to show purpose. In
subsection (a)(1) cases, the prosecution would have to show that the
operator’s purpose was the distribution of drugs.216 In subsection (a)(2)
cases, the prosecution would have to show that the users of the marketplace
had the purpose of distributing controlled substances and that the operator
was aware of such distribution or acted deliberately ignorant of such
distribution.217 Proving such a purpose would likely be easy in most
subsection (a)(2) cases—especially if the vast majority of the transactions
were drug transactions.218 While more difficult in subsection (a)(1) cases,
proving such a purpose could be done where the facts are strong, such as in
the Ulbricht case.219
214. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 331 U.S. 519, 528–29 (1947)
(“[T]he title of a statute and the heading of a section cannot limit the plain meaning of the
text.”).
215. See, e.g., United States v. Clavis, 956 F.2d 1079, 1091 (11th Cir. 1992) (“Acts
evidencing such matters as control, duration, acquisition of the site, renting or furnishing the
site, repairing the site, supervising, protecting, supplying food to those at the site, and
continuity are, of course, evidence of knowingly maintaining the place considered alone or in
combination with evidence of distributing from that place.”); United States v. Roberts, 913
F.2d 211, 221 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding that sufficient dominion and control were shown in
crack house prosecution where the defendant paid rent on his condo, his jacket was found
inside the condo, police found him in the condo during the search warrant execution, a witness
had observed defendant cutting cocaine inside the condo, and the defendant had arranged to
swap the condo with someone else’s apartment temporarily); see also United States v.
Basinger, 60 F.3d 1400, 1405 (9th Cir. 1995) (summarizing other courts’ treatment of the
“dominion and control” inquiry).
216. Basinger, 60 F.3d at 1404; see also supra note 93 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
219. See, e.g., Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Post-Trial Motions at 3–4, United
States v. Ulbricht, No. 14-cr-68 (KBF) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2015), 2015 WL 1530766
(evidence produced by the prosecution included “thousands of pages of chat logs, reflecting
Ulbricht’s communications with coconspirators who helped him run Silk Road”; “files in
which Ulbricht wrote about how he conceived of Silk Road, launched it, and grew it into a
bustling illegal enterprise”; “a ‘log’ file reflecting actions taken by Ulbricht in connection with
the day-to-day maintenance of Silk Road”; and other items).
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C. Why Push for This Reading At All?
Given successful narcotics conspiracy prosecutions,220 why push for the
crack house statute as a prosecutorial tool in dark net drug marketplace cases
at all? Three reasons advise it: first, as compared with conspiracy law, the
crack house statute provides a better conceptual fit for the typical dark net
drug marketplace operator’s actions; second, the crack house charge avoids
the unique prejudices suffered by the defendant in the typical dark net drug
marketplace case; and third, the ongoing overdose crisis in America demands
creative prosecutorial tools in the absence of the strong facts necessary to
charge a narcotics conspiracy in these cases.
First, for a variety of reasons, the conspiracy to distribute narcotics charge
is a poor fit in the case of the typical dark net drug marketplace operator.221
In short, the difficulties are that: (1) the typical marketplace structure creates
individual conspiracies between the operator and each of the sellers rather
than a single conspiracy encompassing the operators and every seller on the
site;222 (2) issues exist at the individual seller level as to what conspiracy they
knowingly and intentionally join;223 (3) the only categorical difference
between dark net drug marketplaces and legitimate online marketplaces is
the intent of the operator/management team;224 and (4) the public policy
objectives for the standalone conspiracy charge are not as salient in the dark
net drug marketplace operator case.225
Alleging a single, all-encompassing conspiracy in the typical dark net drug
marketplace operator case, where no conspiracies or multiple operator-seller
conspiracies exist, poses unique prejudices to the operator, generally due to
the sheer number of coconspirators alleged.226 First, the typical operator
likely suffers prejudice when he or she is alleged to have masterminded a
large, thousand-person conspiracy, and this prejudice is especially acute
when the prosecution fails to introduce evidence as to each operator-seller
relationship at trial. Second, large, complex trials pose issues for juries, court
resources, and defendants.227 While only a single operator faces trial in the
typical dark net drug marketplace case, complexity issues remain concerning
220. See supra note 9.
221. See supra Part II.B.
222. See supra Part II.B.1.
223. See supra Part II.B.2.
224. See supra Part II.B.3.
225. See supra Part II.B.4.
226. See, e.g., Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 650 (1946) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the dangers of conspiracy law include “the almost unlimited scope of
vicarious responsibility for others’ acts which follows once agreement is shown, [and] the
psychological advantages of such trials for securing convictions by attributing to one proof
against another”); see also Note, Federal Treatment of Multiple Conspiracy, 57 COLUM. L.
REV. 387, 403 (1957) (discussing Kotteakos v. United States and stating that it was
distinguishable from prior precedent in part because “Kotteakos appears to be inextricably
involved with numbers”).
227. See, e.g., Paul Marcus, Criminal Conspiracy Law: Time to Turn Back from an Ever
Expanding, Ever More Troubling Area, 1 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 10–14 (1992)
(compiling practitioner concerns over trials involving large amounts of coconspirators).
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the evidence necessary to prove each conspiracy and the number of
individual relationships. Third, the doctrine of the crime of conspiracy
naturally tends to grow,228 so experimental and tangential uses of the
conspiracy charge should be carefully guarded against, employed only when
the public interest goals of the standalone conspiracy charge are most
salient.229
Finally, although the conspiracy charge is ill-fit for the typical dark net
drug marketplace operator, the crack house charge can serve as an excellent
replacement tool, especially at a time when the opioid epidemic demands
effective intervention by law enforcement. Overdose deaths have risen to a
zenith in recent years, and though the crisis has shown signs of leveling off,
the number of overdose deaths is still unacceptably high.230 While it is
beyond the scope of this Note to argue that the dark net is a cause of the
overdose epidemic, the sheer volume of drug transactions that occur on dark
net drug marketplaces, along with the large revenues that operators are
earning, suggests that these marketplaces are a contributing source. At the
individual level, dark net drug marketplace transactions have resulted in
overdose deaths.231
D. Addressing Counterarguments
This use of the crack house statute is novel and, admittedly, there may be
one or more good reasons for this novelty. This section addresses some
arguments against using the crack house statute in this manner, and
ultimately argues that despite them, the crack house statute is a better
prosecutorial fit than conspiracy law. The arguments against using the statute
in this manner can be approximated as: first, the language of the statute, as
evidenced by the statute’s legislative history, cannot sanction this use;
second, the rule of lenity prohibits this type of expansive reading of the
228. See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring in
the judgment) (criticizing the case at hand as “characteristic of the long evolution of that
elastic, sprawling and pervasive offense,” the offense of conspiracy). Justice Robert H.
Jackson, quoting Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo, stated that conspiracy’s history exemplifies
the “tendency of a principle to expand itself to the limit of its logic.” Id.
229. The public policy goals supporting the substantive conspiracy charge are not met in
the typical dark net drug marketplace operator prosecution. See supra Part II.B.4.
230. See supra Part I.A.
231. See, e.g., Noelle Crombie, Two Fentanyl Overdose Deaths Tied to Dark Web Lead to
Portland Charges, OREGONIAN (July 12, 2017), https://www.oregonlive.com/pacificnorthwest-news/index.ssf/2017/07/pennsylvania_man_accused_of_se.html [https://perma.cc/
S2KR-B8XM]; Joseph Dill, ‘Darknet’ Drug Distributor Gets Life Sentence for Overdose of
Woman with Loudoun Ties, LOUDOUN TRIB. (Apr. 27, 2018), https://
www.loudountribune.com/darknet-drug-distributor-gets-life-sentence-for-overdose-ofwoman-with-loudoun-ties/ [https://perma.cc/5XMT-PFK8]; Jesse Hyde, The Park City Story:
One Boy Died, Then Another—and the Opioid Epidemic Came into Full View, DESERET NEWS
(July 20, 2017), https://www.deseretnews.com/article/900000352/the-park-city-story-oneboy-died-then-another-and-the-opioid-epidemic- came-into-full-view.html [https://perma.cc/
DDR8-KBEX]; Amanda Shaw, Feds: ‘Peter the Great’ Darknet Drug Suspects Linked to
Two Deaths, FOX CAROLINA (May 11, 2018), https://www.foxcarolina.com/news/feds-peterthe-great-darknet-drug-suspects-linked-to-deaths/article_82262390-077f-5245-ac3ef3688acb2207.html [https://perma.cc/WJP8-594B].
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statute; finally, given successful prosecutions under conspiracy law and other
charges, this novel reading of the crack house statute is unnecessary.
The crack house statute’s legislative history suggests that it was not
intended to cover dark net drug marketplaces. The statute was enacted in
1986,232 several years before the creation of the World Wide Web and far
before the concept of a dark web drug marketplace was fathomable.233 The
statute was amended in 2003, and while the amendment expanded the statute
to include the now-existing “place” language,234 the purpose of the
amendment was at least partly to provide for prosecutions of drug activity at
outdoor “rave” parties.235 The history of the statute, then, may imply that
internet locations should not be covered by “place,” an assertion bolstered by
the fact that the heading of 21 U.S.C. § 856 is “Maintaining Drug-Involved
Premises,” which more strongly denotes a physical location. This argument,
while persuasive, is ultimately weaker than the simple plain text of the
statute. A “place” can mean many different locations other than physical
spaces, as evidenced by both the word’s common use and its dictionary
definition.236
The rule of lenity might also prohibit this kind of expansive reading of the
crack house statute. The rule of lenity237—serving the goals of providing
notice to the public,238 guaranteeing that courts do not sanction overbroad
readings of statutes,239 and enhancing the transparency and accountability of
criminal justice240—circumscribes experimental uses of statutes. This
232. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
233. Martin Bryant, Twenty Years Ago Today, the World Wide Web Opened to the Public,
TNW (Aug. 6, 2011), https://thenextweb.com/insider/2011/08/06/20-years-ago-today-theworld-wide-web-opened-to-the-public/ [https://perma.cc/3HNR-DXXB]; History of the Web,
WORLD WIDE WEB FOUND., https://webfoundation.org/about/vision/history-of-the-web/
[https://perma.cc/C6YR-AL3J] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
234. See supra notes 86–92 and accompanying text.
235. Ethan Brown, Safe to Dance, N.Y. MAG. (Mar. 10, 2003), http://nymag.com/
nymetro/news/trends/columns/cityside/n_8430/ [https://perma.cc/LQ33-YFDP]; Janelle
Brown, Your Glow Stick Could Land You in Jail, SALON (Apr. 16, 2003, 9:29 PM),
https://www.salon.com/2003/04/16/rave/ [https://perma.cc/M2HA-MSMJ]; Craig McGuire,
Nightclub Act II, GOTHAM GAZETTE (Nov. 17, 2003), http://www.gothamgazette.com/
development/2107-nightclub-act-ii [https://perma.cc/2CCE-B3AD].
236. Place, supra note 201; see also supra note 202 and accompanying text.
237. Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971) (“[A]mbiguity concerning the ambit
of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.” (citation omitted)).
238. McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) (“Although it is not likely that a
criminal will carefully consider the text of the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable
that a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will
understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed.”). The Court held that a
statute which defined a motor vehicle and “evoke[d] in the common mind only the picture of
vehicles moving on land” did not include airplanes in that definition. Id.
239. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (“[B]ecause of the seriousness of
criminal penalties, and because criminal punishment usually represents the moral
condemnation of the community, legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity.”).
240. Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885,
912 (2004). Price argues that neither the notice nor the legislative supremacy rationales for
the rule of lenity are particular strong and makes a good argument for a rule of lenity based on
the sturdier foundations of enhancing the transparency and accountability of criminal justice.
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argument, while similarly persuasive, is rebutted by the fact that the rule of
lenity may only apply when a statute is ambiguous.241 While the word
“place” is broad, it is not necessarily ambiguous, and its common use
suggests that it is often used to refer to internet locations.242 The statute’s
more restrictive 1986 text was amended to cover more “places” rather than
just buildings.243 While the rule of lenity serves to give prosecutors pause
before experimental uses of statutes, it does not bar them completely if the
statute is unambiguous.
Finally, one might ask why it is advisable to stretch the statute in this
manner at all. Part III.C addressed this question in part,244 but there are a
bevy of other solutions available to the federal prosecutor as well. Ulbricht,
for example, was convicted not only of conspiracy to distribute narcotics but
of six other crimes.245 While a conspiracy to distribute narcotics might not
be the best-fitting charge in a dark net drug marketplace case, why would a
prosecutor go out of his or her way to be the first to charge a crack house
violation? The answer lies in the fact that the statute perfectly proscribes the
type of behavior that the operator engages in. The culpability of the operator
is not that of a buyer, not that of a seller, and not that of a “runner” that brings
drugs from the seller to the buyer. It is the culpability of the person who
makes large-scale drug operations possible while profiting from them as
well. This is exactly the type of activity that the crack house statute
penalizes. The typical dark net drug marketplace operator, through his
expertise, experience, and criminal intent, makes possible a bazaar of drug
dealing—not as a “cog” in a larger “machine” conspiracy, but as the person
who provides that machine a clandestine space from which to operate, all
while charging rent. The operator’s behavior is nearly identical to the person
the crack house statute was written to address—someone who is not directly
involved in dealing drugs him or herself but who instead maintains a
residence, business, venue, or place for the purpose of the distribution of
drugs. This deserves its own crime—a crime codified at 21 U.S.C. § 856.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Note is not to soften the treatment of operators of dark
net drug marketplaces. While proponents of such places laud them as the
ultimate free market platform,246 the drug trade they enable inevitably leads

241. Bass, 404 U.S. at 348 (“[W]here there is ambiguity in a criminal statute, doubts are
resolved in favor of the defendant.”).
242. See supra note 202.
243. See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text.
244. See supra Part III.C.
245. Verdict Form at 1–4, United States v. Ulbricht, No. 14-cr-68 (KBF) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5,
2015), 2015 WL 495543.
246. Tom Ough, ‘It’s a Self-Regulating Free Market’: How the Dark Web Brought
Consumerism to Drugs, TELEGRAPH (May 26, 2016), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/men/
thinking-man/its-a-self-regulating-free-market-how-the-dark-web-brought-consu/
[https://
perma.cc/Y2EH-SQVG]; Nathaniel Popper, Hansa Market, a Dark Web Marketplace, Bans
the Sale of Fentanyl, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (July 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com
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to death, either in the form of overdoses247 or violence.248 Instead, this Note
argues that the criminal charge must fit the behavior. The conspiracy to
distribute narcotics charge is a poor fit. The crack house charge is a better
fit. While the statute is potentially ambiguous, it is a valid law enforcement
tool. Should expanding the statute in this way be too experimental for courts,
the statute should be amended, as it was in 2003, to cover the new digital
frontier of drug dealing. Technological advances allow for evolution in
criminal enterprise—law enforcement must be allowed to evolve alongside
them.

/2017/07/18/business/dealbook/hansa-market-a-dark-web-marketplace-bans-the-sale-offentanyl.html [https://perma.cc/X84U-J53H].
247. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
248. See, e.g., Transcript of Sentencing Decision at 82–83, United States v. Ulbricht, No.
14-cr-68 (KBF) (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2015) (mentioning Ulbricht’s commission of five
murders).

